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Abstract 
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a significant and controversial security issue in the 
world today. The United States (U.S.) is the leader in BMD development and deployment. 
This thesis analyzes the differing orientations to BMD of two key U.S. allies, Japan and 
Canada. The central questions asked in the thesis are: Why did Japan choose to join the U.S.-
led BMD program as an active cooperative country in 2003, while Canada chose not to 
formally join in 2005? What inferences can we draw about "BMD politics" from these 
decisions? These questions were answered in three steps. First, I developed an analytic 
approach inspired by Putnam's "two-level game theory." Second, I applied this approach to 
my two case studies. Japan-U.S. and Canada-U.S. BMD relations between 1983 and 2008 
were analyzed at two levels, domestic and international, which resulted in identifying six 
international-related factors and two domestic-related factors influencing Japan's and 
Canada's BMD decision-making process. And third, the two case studies were compared and 
analyzed. I conclude that the basis for the two countries' foreign policy decisions was 
significantly different. Japanese foreign policy decision-making was rooted in realist thinking, 
while Canadian foreign policy decision-making was rooted in a combination of liberal 
internationalist and realist thinking. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a significant and controversial security issue in the 
world today. It is significant because missile proliferation activities, such as those of Iran and 
North Korea, can have a destabilizing influence on international relations, and it is 
controversial because even though supporters of BMD cite its importance in curbing arms 
races and preventing regional wars, critics describe it as unrealistic, comparing it to "hitting a 
bullet with a bullet."1 
This chapter introduces the overall framework of this thesis. Section 1.2 presents the 
historical and political context of BMD issues. Section 1.3 presents my research questions. 
Section 1.4 presents the methodology I used. Section 1.5 presents the answers to my 
research questions. Section 1.6 presents the value or benefits of the thesis, and Section 1.7 
presents the order of chapters. 
1.2 Context 
The construction of ballistic missiles and missile intercepting systems dates from 
World War II (WWII). The first use of missiles in warfare occurred when Germany launched 
rocket attacks against France and Britain in 1944. Thereafter, missile attacks became a new 
military threat demanding new military strategies to counteract. In particular, the onset of the 
Cold War led the two main protagonists, the United States (U.S.) and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), to rapidly develop not only nuclear weapons but also ballistic 
1
 Well Keener, "Hitting a Bullet with a Bullet," Sandia National Laboratories: Quarterly Research and 
Development Journal 5 (2004): 7. 
1 
missiles to deliver them. In turn, this led to the development of missile defense systems to 
protect against missile attacks. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. dramatically increased 
their inventory of nuclear weapons and number of ballistic missiles, and they tried to develop 
feasible missile defense systems. By the late 1960s, due to the dramatic increase in the 
number of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the two countries realized the necessity of 
arms cuts. They began disarmament talks that turned into the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT), which included BMD. Anti-ballistic missile defense systems were developed 
to reduce an opponent's missile strike capabilities. However, the defensive use of missiles 
had the potential to trigger an increase in the number of ballistic missiles because both 
countries were afraid of losing their offensive missile attack capabilities, and hence would be 
likely to increase offensive missile numbers so as to overwhelm any defensive capabilities. 
To address this, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. concluded the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABMT), which strictly regulated the number and location of U.S. and U.S.S.R. anti-ballistic 
missile systems. However, BMD research and development continued. 
The Ronald Reagan administration ushered in a new era of BMD development in 
1983 when it introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) designed to defend the U.S. 
from Soviet nuclear attacks. Reagan's goal was to construct a military defense system to 
make nuclear weapons powerless and outdated.3 For that purpose, he sought support 
worldwide, including from Japan and Canada. 
2
 Tetsuya Umemoto, "Hondo Misairu Boei no Tenkai" (Development of National Missile Defense), in Satoshi 
Morimoto ed., Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kbzu (Missile Defense: New Design for 
International Security) (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), 2002), 34. 
3
 Ibid, 38. 
2 
After the Cold War ended around 1990, the George H. W. Bush administration 
established the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) defense initiative, which 
focused on new potential ballistic missile threats, especially from the third world.4 GPALS 
included both ground-based National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) systems designed for intercepting shorter-range missiles, including short range 
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs),5 and 
prioritized security for U.S. foreign-deployed troops and U.S. allies.6 
At first, the Clinton administration continued the concept of the GPALS; however, in 
the late 1990s emphasis was placed on NMD over TMD because countries like the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) were constructing missiles that could 
potentially reach the continental U.S. NMD systems were designed chiefly for defending the 
continental U.S. In all these efforts, the U.S. collaborated with allied and friendly nations, 
such as Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom (U.K.). In the 1990s, none of these countries faced urgent missile threats, except 
Japan. 
In the early 2000s, the U.S. BMD program underwent another significant change. The 
George W. Bush administration withdrew from the ABMT in 2002, which then permitted the 
U.S. to deploy BMD systems without strict restrictions. This move forced U.S. allies to 
decide whether or not to join the American BMD program. By 2010, six countries— 
4
 Michael Byers, Intent for a Nation: A Relentlessly Optimistic Manifesto for Canada's Role in the World 
(Vancouver/Toronto: Douglas & Mclntyre, 2007), 41. 
5
 James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile 
Defense (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 38. 
6RobertM. Soofer, "Joint Theater Missile Defense Strategy," Joint Force Quarterly (1995): 71. 
7
 Takashi Kawakami and Ken Jinbo, "Dando Misairu Boei to Nichibei Domei," (Ballistic Missile Defense and 
the Japan-U.S. Alliance), in Satoshi Morimoto ed., Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kbzu 
(Missile Defense: New Design for International Security) (Tokyo: JIIA, 2002), 271. 
3 
Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and the U.K.—had formally chosen to 
participate in U.S. research and development, and fourteen countries and one international 
organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had chosen to cooperate 
o 
(informally participate) with the U.S. BMD program. Canada in 2005 declined to officially 
join in the program. 
1.3 Research Question 
My general interest is in "BMD politics"; specifically, determining why countries 
decide to join or not to join the U.S. BMD program. This led me to analyzing in this thesis 
the differing orientations to BMD of two key U.S. allies: Japan and Canada. As a Japanese 
citizen, I was curious as to why the Japanese government gradually joined the U.S. BMD 
program and eventually became one of its most enthusiastic supporters. And, as a foreign 
student studying in Canada, I was also curious why Canada did not formally join and was not 
an overt supporter of the U.S. program. I therefore decided to conduct a comparative study of 
these two countries. The fact that both Canada and Japan are middle-power states with a 
strong and positive working relationship with the U.S. provided justification for comparing 
them. In other words, they are comparable case studies. 
During the 1980s, Japan and Canada had similar stances to the U.S. BMD program. 
Both governments were hesitant to officially join in SDI efforts. The only major difference 
was that Canada was connected to U.S. missile defense strategy through the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The NORAD relationship began in the late 1950s; 
8
 Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U S Department of Defense (DOD), "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview: 
8th Annual Missile Defense Conference," (2010), 
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/bmds_briefinglO.pdf (accessed April 29, 2010) Chapter II, Figure 
2-3 (Highlights of International Missile Defense Activity) details these countries' BMD involvement 
4 
thus, Canada and the U.S. had a more advanced basis for their BMD relationship than was 
the case for Japan and the U.S. This was true through the 1980s. Starting in the early 1990s, 
though, Japan and Canada began to go in different directions and by the mid-2000s they had 
chosen opposite paths. In 2003, Japan formally joined the U.S. BMD program; in 2005, 
Canada decided not to participate in the program even while maintaining its NORAD 
connection after the non-participation decision. Why did these two middle-power states take 
different paths? The central questions asked in the thesis are: Why did Japan choose to join 
the U.S.-led BMD program as an active cooperative country in 2003, while Canada chose 
not to formally join in 2005? What inferences can we draw about "BMD politics" from these 
decisions? 
To answer the first question I needed to examine Japan and Canada's decision-
making processes on BMD from 1983 (start of Reagan's SDI and start of both country's 
entanglement in the U.S. BMD program) to the 2000s because it turns out a complex 
historical layering of factors, rather than a simple set of factors that existed only in 2003 and 
2005, explained the choices. Thus, in my thesis I trace the evolution of Japan's and Canada's 
involvement in the U.S. BMD program. For the sake of completeness, I continued my 
examination beyond the decision dates to 2008 (the end of the George W. Bush 
administration) to determine whether the nature of Japan's support and Canada's non-support 
changed after 2003 and 2005, respectively. 
1.4 Methodology 
My thesis is a comparative study. My central questions were answered in three steps. 
The first step was to develop a method for the study. To my knowledge, there are no 
comparative studies in the BMD literature of the sort I undertook in this thesis. Since there 
5 
was no method that I could imitate, I developed one using Putnam's "two-level game theory" 
as a starting point.9 
Because I could not find in the BMD literature a systematically laid out set of 
variables that might explain BMD decisions, I decided to follow an inductive approach. In 
other words, rather than beginning with a comprehensive framework of variables, I 
systematically extracted variables from the case study literature and then at the end organized 
them into a framework. Thus, rather than starting with a detailed framework and applying it 
my case studies, I started with the case studies and derived from them a detailed framework. I 
did, however, develop an overarching organizing structure to apply to the case studies which 
had two elements: (1) codification of historical trends, and (2) division into two classes of 
variables based on Putnam's work, international and domestic variables. 
Putnam suggests "a conceptual framework for understanding how diplomacy and 
domestic politics interact" based on observing both the international and domestic levels of a 
political decision-making process.10 I chose this theory because in BMD politics, in most 
cases, including those of Japan and Canada, governments are placed in complicated 
dilemmas domestically and internationally. Putnam's theory emphasizes this duality and 
seeks to explain how the domestic and international levels are linked and how the linkages 
influence decision-making processes and final decisions by nation-states. It is reasonable to 
assume that a state's final decision on whether or not to join the U.S. BMD program is 
influenced by both domestic and international factors. At the domestic level, states deal with 
9
 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International 
Organization 42 (1988). 
10
 Ibid, 430. 
6 
internal political factors and actors related to BMD. At the international level, they negotiate 
with the U.S. and determine whether participation would be beneficial to them. Therefore, 
my research analyzed BMD issues between Japan-U.S. and Canada-U.S. from two 
perspectives: international (external) and domestic (internal). 
The second step of my method was to apply my Putnam-inspired approach to the case 
studies of Japan and Canada. Each case study is presented in three sections of analysis. The 
first introduces historical trends and tendencies in terms of bilateral relationships with the 
U.S. over BMD politics during three periods from 1983 to 2008. The second section presents 
the inductively derived international variables/factors, and the third section presents the 
inductively derived domestic variables/factors. 
And, the third step of my method was to compare the two case studies. I needed 
initially to create a consistent set of factors applicable to both cases. These factors were 
derived from an examination of the commonalities in the factors derived from the two case 
studies. For the international perspective, I identified six categories: economic and financial 
issues, military capabilities, missile threat perceptions, alliance issues, protecting national 
image, and protecting sovereignty. For the domestic perspective, I identified two categories: 
public opinion and government's legal and political adaptability. Not all of factors however 
were relevant to each case. Then based on the aforementioned eight categories of factors I 
compared the case studies. Results of this comparison yielded the answer to my central 
questions. 
1.5 Answers to Research Questions 
My central research question is: Why did Japan choose to join the U.S.-led BMD 
program as an active cooperative country in 2003, while Canada chose not to formally join in 
7 
2005? Based on application of the above methodology, I found that four factors at the 
international level and two factors at the domestic level influenced Japan's BMD politics; 
especially, three main international factors directly explain Japan's decision to join: 
strengthening Japan's military capability, responding to missile threats in Northeast Asia, and 
resolving alliance dilemmas with the U.S. These factors suggest that Japanese foreign policy 
decision-making was rooted in realist thinking. 
I found that six factors in the international level and one factor in the domestic level 
influenced Canada's BMD politics; especially, five main international factors and one main 
domestic factor directly explain Canada's decision not to formally join: protecting Canada's 
long-held liberal internationalist reputation, protecting Canada's freedom of action in foreign 
policy, being unconvinced of missile threats, opposition to U.S. foreign policy under George 
W. Bush, using the NORAD connection, and public opposition to BMD. These factors 
suggest that Canadian foreign policy decision-making was rooted in a combination of liberal 
internationalist and realist thinking. 
1.6 Benefit of Thesis 
My comparative analysis will broaden understanding of international responses to 
BMD, in particular bilateral relationships between the U.S. and middle-power allies. In 
addition, I set forth a method that seems to be new in the BMD field. Most research on BMD 
has focused on the U.S. BMD program alone or bilateral relations with the U.S. The majority 
of Japan's and Canada's BMD research is no exception; it chiefly focuses on bilateral 
relations and negotiations with the U.S. at the international level. 
In addition, although many scholarly books and articles focus on the U.S. and seek to 
explain the influence of the U.S.-led BMD program on world affairs from a practical military 
8 
viewpoint, few consider the political relations between the U.S. and its allies relative to BMD. 
Thus, my research provides fresh perspectives for policy-makers; especially, by shedding 
light on overlooked parts of middle power states' political concerns regarding BMD issues. 
In the end, my hope is that my research will contribute to informed debate on the merits and 
demerits of BMD. 
1.7 Order of Chapters 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, including this introduction (Chapter I). Chapter 
II provides background. The concept of missile defense is defined and the historical 
development of BMD from the 1950s to 2008 is explained. Chapter III contains a review of 
the literature on BMD, and a more detailed explanation of my methodology. Chapter IV is 
the Japan case study, and Chapter V is the Canada case study. Chapter VI is the comparative 
analysis of Japan and Canada, bringing together the material of Chapters IV and V. This 
analysis provides the answer to my central question as to why these two countries chose 
opposite paths in their relationship to the U.S. BMD program. In Chapter VII (Conclusion), I 
review of my research, discuss its limitations, make suggestions for future research, and 
briefly look at changes in BMD politics since the election of President Obama. 
9 
Chapter II: Background - Understanding Ballistic Missile Defense 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides background on BMD issues. Specifically, Section 2.2 defines 
BMD and offers a brief history, focusing especially on the U.S. Section 2.3 presents ballistic 
missiles in global perspective. Section 2.4 outlines cooperation with U.S. BMD program. 
Lastly, Section 2.5 wraps up and provides a lead-in to the literature review in chapter 3. 
2.2 Definition and Brief History 
BMD is a military system whose objective is the detection, tracking, interception and 
destruction of airborne missiles. As the term is used today, it refers to not only a technical 
system used against ballistic missile threats but also a military strategy embodying the notion 
of "strategic defense power."11 In the Cold War era, military strategy was evaluated primarily 
in terms of the strength of nuclear attack capabilities, chiefly between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. However, in the post-Cold War period the focus has shifted from offensive to 
defensive capabilities, (i.e., deterring nuclear attacks by using military defense systems) such 
as BMD. 
The concept of BMD originated as early as in the 1950s. Motivated by Germany's 
use of V-2 rockets against France and Britain in 1944, the Eisenhower administration (1953-
1961) began BMD research and development in 1955. At the beginning of the Cold War, 
American researchers focused on intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
which were used for delivery of nuclear weapons from the U.S.S.R.13 However, this research 
" Satoshi Morimoto, "Misairu Boei to Anzen Hosho" (Missile Defense and Security), in Satoshi Morimoto ed., 
Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kozu (Missile Defense: New Design for International 
Security) (Tokyo: JIIA, 2002), 4. 
12
 Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Technology in Search of a Mission (Lexington, KY: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 2002), 6. 
13
 Morimoto, Missile Defense, 4. 
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and development lasted for only a short period of time, first, because developing BMD 
systems was technologically difficult and costly, and second, because their development was 
contrary to the concept of "mutual deterrence", a military strategy in which countries are 
inhibited from attacking each other by placing themselves in mutually vulnerable positions, 
which means that even in the case that one country is attacked by the other, the country still 
maintains enough capability to retaliate for the enemy attack. The concept of mutual 
deterrence applied especially to nuclear weaponry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during 
the Cold War, and eventually resulted in the military strategy of Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD). Under MAD, BMD was interpreted as a theoretically dangerous concept 
because BMD could potentially neutralize ballistic missile attacks.14 BMD systems reduced 
an opponent's missile strike capabilities. As a result, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. concluded the 
ABMT in 1972, in order to maintain the MAD structure. Under this treaty, the two countries 
agreed to limit deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems. The treaty was in force 
for thirty years until the U.S. withdrew in June 2002. 
The Ford administration (1974-1977) and the Carter administration (1977-1981) 
continued research and development but neither administration prioritized BMD due to the 
ABMT.15 From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, however, opposition to MAD increased on 
the U.S. side.16 This resulted in a major change in BMD policy. The Reagan administration 
(1981-1989) proposed the SDI, dubbed "Star Wars", in 1983. This initiative was based on the 
military concept of "strategic defense." In order to protect the U.S. from Soviet nuclear 
attacks, a "defensive umbrella of satellite detection systems" and "space-based futuristic 
14
 Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath, War in Heaven: The Arms Race in Outer Space (New York: The New 
Press, 2007), 8. 
15
 Umemoto, Missile Defense, 38. 
16
 Ibid. 
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technologies" were envisioned.17 Reagan's goal was to construct a military defense system 
to make nuclear weapons powerless and outdated.18 Work continued on SDI for the 
remainder of the 1980s. 
The end of the Cold War caused a major change in U.S. BMD policy. In the early 
1990s, the George H. W. Bush administration (1989-1993) established the GPALS defense 
initiative, which focused on new potential ballistic missile threats, especially from the third 
world.19 GPALS included ground-based NMD and TMD systems designed for intercepting 
shorter-range missiles including SRBMs and IRBMs,20 and prioritized security for U.S. 
foreign-deployed troops and U.S. allies.21 At first, the Clinton administration (1993-2001) 
accepted the concept of GPALS; however, its BMD strategy was eventually altered in the 
late 1990s. 
In the late 1990s, the U.S. began to see ballistic missile development by third world 
countries, such as the D.P.R.K., as posing threats to the continental U.S.; ballistic missile 
attacks reaching the U.S. from such countries were no longer unthinkable. Under increasing 
domestic pressure, especially from the Republican Party, Clinton decided to shift its priority 
from TMD to NMD to protect the U.S. in the event "rouge states" developed missiles 
capable of reaching the U.S.22 In 1999, Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act to 
deploy NMD systems as soon as they proved technologically feasible. During his presidency, 
however, NMD systems were never deployed, not only because the technical feasibility 
17
 David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Jessica Blitt eds., CISS Annual Spring Seminar 2000, Canada and National 
Missile Defense (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 9. 
18
 Umemoto, Missile Defense, 38. 
19
 Byers, Intent for a Nation, 41. 
20
 Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America, 38. 
21
 Soofer, "Joint Theater Missile Defense Strategy," 71. 
Kawakami and Jinbo, Missile Defense, 271. 
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remained unproven, but also because Clinton was worried that the system would potentially 
violate the ABMT.23 
In the early 2000s, another major change in U.S. BMD policy occurred. The trigger 
was the decision of the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009) to withdraw from the 
ABMT in 2002, which then permitted the U.S. to deploy BMD systems. The Bush 
administration based its BMD program on Reagan's SDI framework; hence, it is often 
referred to as "son of Star Wars."24 Both programs employed the concept of the "multiple-
layered defense" in which the anti-ballistic missile system is designed to intercept missiles 
during any one of three phases: boost, midcourse or terminal (Figure 2.1).25 Bush promoted 
BMD research and development for near future deployment and, by the mid-2000s, BMD 
was gradually positioned at the center of security thinking in the U.S. 
Figure 2.1 The Three Segments of the Bush Administration Missile Defense System26 
Bush's multiple-layered defense system integrated NMD and TMD in order to be able 
to intercept ballistic missiles in all three phases, especially the boost phase.27 Focus on the 
boost phase increased the probability of shooting down a missile because a warhead is still 
23
 Umemoto, Missile Defense, 50-51. 
24
 Byers, Intent for a Nation, 68. 
25
 Ibid, 39-40. 
26
 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview," (2008), http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf 
(accessed July 6, 2009), 7. 
27
 Shinichi Ogawa, "Beikoku no Seniki Misairu Boei Keikaku," (The U.S. Theater Missile Defense Plan), in 
Satoshi Morimoto ed., Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kozu (Missile Defense: New Design 
for International Security) (Tokyo: JIIA, 2002), 76. 
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attached to the ballistic missile in the boost phase; thus, a BMD system would not be 
confused by decoys. If the boost phase intercept fails, the system still has chances to try again 
in the mid-course and terminal phases.28 The U.S. thus sought to build integrated and global 
network of ballistic missile defense systems in cooperation with other countries, in large part 
because boost phase interceptors must be based close to potential launch sites.29 
Between 2004 and 2008 (when President Obama was elected), the following BMD 
systems were deployed by the U.S.30 
• 26 GBIs (Ground Based Interceptors) placed in silos in Alaska and California (a 
ground launched anti-ballistic missile) 
• 32 SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) sea-based interceptors (a naval launched anti-ballistic 
missile) 
• 3 Navy Aegis destroyers (which are equipped to shoot down missiles in the mid-
course phase) and 15 destroyers capable of engaging short- to medium-range missiles 
and performing long-range surveillance and track missions 
• 635 Patriot Advanced Capability -3 (PAC-3) missiles (an advanced surface-to-air 
missile) 
• A Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar system (which is a floating radar station deployed 
in ocean waters) 
28 Ibid. 
29
 David Martin, "DandoMisairu Boei," (Ballistic Missile Defense), Embassy of the United States in Japan 
(2002), http://japan.U.S.embassy.gov/j/p/tpj-j20030530d2.html (accessed January 12, 2009); MDA, DOD, 
"Ballistic Missile Defense Overview," (2008), http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf (accessed 
January 12, 2009), 7. 
30
 MDA, DOD, "TESTING: Building Confidence," (2008), 
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/2009MDAbook.pdf (accessed July 12, 2010). 
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• Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) in California and the U.K. and an 
upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska 
• Two Forward-Based X-Band Radars deployed in Japan and Israel 
• Elements of a C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications) system to support five Combatant Commands and the National 
Military Command Center. 
Although no BMD system will reach a guaranteed 100 percent interception rate, 
BMD's accuracy and technical feasibility are key factors in its acceptance as a military 
system. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), established within the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD), states that the current system can only intercept one, or at maximum two, 
"unsophisticated threat" missiles without decoys and countermeasures, such as those 
manufactured by Iran or North Korea.31 Thus, the U.S. BMD system is currently incapable of 
protecting the U.S. and its allies from most ballistic missile attacks. In particular, the system 
is vulnerable and ineffective against attacks from major countries such as Russia and China. 
Regardless of present technical limitations, keen attention is paid to U.S. BMD because it has 
the future potential to tip the nuclear balance of power in America's favor. 
2.3 Ballistic Missiles in Global Perspective 
Approximately 40 countries possess ballistic missiles (Table 2.1). As can be seen in 
Table 2.1, most countries possess short-range missiles, and only five countries currently have 
the technical capability to launch long-range missiles: China, France, Russia, U.K. and U.S.32 
The U.S. sees Russia and China as the main threats. The D.P.R.K., Iran, and Syria are 
31
 Philip E. Coyle, and III and Victoria A. Samson, "Taking Aim at Missile Defense," Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists 64 (2008): 4. 
32
 Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America, 52. 
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assumed threats due to their unclear intentions. However, it will likely take at least fifteen 
years for these "rogue states" to develop intermediate and long-range missiles capable of 
reaching the U.S.34 
Table 2.1 Countries Possessing Ballistic Missiles35 
Countries possessing only short-range 
missiles (<600 miles) 
Afghanistan 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Congo 
Czech Republic 
Egypt 
Georgia 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iraq 
Kazakhstan 
Libya 
South Korea 
Slovakia 
Syria 
Taiwan 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
United Arab Emirates 
Ukraine 
Yemen 
Hideaki Kaneda, Dando Misairu Boei Nyumon: Arata na Kaku Yokushi Senryaku to Waga Kuni no Dando 
Misairu Boei (Introduction to Ballistic Missile Defense: New Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence and Japan's 
BMD) (Tokyo: Kaya Press, 2003), 82-88. 
34
 Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America, 50. 
35
 Table adapted by the author based on Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project, "The World's Ballistic Missile 
Arsenals," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2003), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm (accessed June 29, 2010). 
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Countries possessing short- and 
intermediate-range missiles (600-3500 
miles) 
India 
Iran 
Israel 
North Korea 
Pakistan 
Saudi Arabia 
Countries possessing short-, intermediate-, 
and long-range missiles (>3500 miles) 
China 
France 
Russia 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Of the countries in Table 2.1, some potential adversaries of the U.S. have active 
ballistic missile programs, for example Iran and North Korea (Figure 2.2). Accordingly, the 
U.S. is seeking to "increase the breadth and depth of our missile defenses by adding more 
forward-deployed, network sensors, and additional interceptors based at sea and on land" 
through working with other countries and regions.36 In 2009, eleven countries were 
cooperating with the U.S.-led BMD program, or had agreed to cooperate in the near future, 
and nine countries have expressed interest or begun discussions on BMD issues with the 
U.S.37 
36
 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview," (2008), http //www mda mil/mdahnk/pdf/bmdsbook pdf 
(accessed January 12, 2009), 7 
37
 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for National Defense University Breakfast Seminar," 
(2009), http //www mda mil/mdalink/pdf7bmds_bnefing09 pdf (accessed July 30, 2010), 2. 
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Figure 2.2 Select Countries Possessing Ballistic Missile (2009) 38 
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2.4 Cooperation with U.S. BMD 
There are many controversies over BMD, for example, high cost, unproven 
effectiveness, and high political risks due to the potential of BMD systems to alter the current 
power structure, especially if the feasibility of missile defense systems is proven However, 
as illustrated in Figure 2 3, a number of nations have been participating in the U S -led BMD 
program or have at least shown interest in it. Why? 
38
 Ibid 
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Figure 2.3 Highlights of International Missile Defense Activity 
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First, overt or potential threats due to worldwide missile proliferation have 
dramatically increased in recent years. Ballistic missile tests by North Korea in the 1990s 
caused great anxiety in Japan.40 Arms proliferation, especially in third world countries, is a 
major concern. A black market in weapons has been expanding among not only nations but 
also non-governmental actors such as terrorist organizations.41 
39
 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for National Defense University Breakfast Seminar," 
(2009), http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmds_briefing09.pdf (accessed July 31, 2009), 7. 
40
 Hiroyasu Akustu, "Kitachosen wo Meguru Kokusai Kankei: America no Senryaku to Nihon no Anzen 
Hosho," (International Relations over North Korea: U.S. Strategy and Japanese Security), in Masahiro 
Sakamoto and Tadamasa Fukiura eds., Atarashii Nihon no Anzen Hosho wo Kangaeru (Consider New Japanese 
Security) (Tokyo: Jiyu Kokumin Press, 2003), 361. 
41
 Izuru Sugawara, "Tai-tero Senso to Iraku Senso," (Anti-Terrorism War and Iraqi War), in Sakamoto and 
Fukiura eds., Consider New Japanese Security, 87. 
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Second, the concept of deterrence has been shifting from traditional "offense-
dominant deterrence" to "defense-dominant deterrence."42 In the post-Cold War era, the 
U.S.'s perception of missile threats has shifted from the U.S.S.R. to regional challengers such 
as "rogue states." The U.S. used to focus on "nuclear deterrence" to defend itself from the 
U.S.S.R.'s nuclear attacks. However, due to the threat shift, "denial deterrence", defined as a 
type of a strategy that minimizes antagonists' attack effectiveness by strengthening defense 
capabilities, has become a central military strategy.43 The tipping point is considered to be 
Iraq's use of theatre ballistic missiles in the Gulf War.44 BMD is a key element of denial 
deterrence.45 The U.S. 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states "defensive systems 
capable of intercepting ballistic missiles may reduce the necessity for nuclear weapons to 
hold at risk an adversary's missile launchers."46 
Third, the September 11 terrorist attacks prompted the U.S. and other countries to 
strengthen their "defensive power" for protecting their homelands. These terrorist attacks 
using commercial airplanes exposed the vulnerability of U.S. defense capabilities to protect 
its homeland. Because missile proliferation has been increasing and missile acquisition is 
easier, and because some international terrorist groups are gaining in military power and 
influence, it is wise planning to assume those groups may try to obtain missiles and use them 
against their perceived enemies. In this regard, in order to prepare for the worst case 
scenario—namely, international terrorist groups gaining access to ICBMs to attack the U.S. 
42
 Taku Ishikawa, "Reisengo no Yokushi Taisei to Dando Misairu Boei" (Deterrence Posture in the Post-Cold 
War and Ballistic Missile Defense), in Satoshi Monmoto ed , Misairu Boei Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no 
Kozu {Missile Defense New Design for International Security) (Tokyo JIIA, 2002), 217-218 
43
 Tadashi Kawata and Hideki Ohata, eds , Kokusai Seiji Keizai Jiten (Dictionary of International Politics and 
Economics) (Tokyo Tokyo Shoseki Press, 2003), 735 
44
 Ishikawa, Missile Defense, 212-213 
45
 Keith B Payne, "The Case for National Missile Defense," Orbis 44 (2000)- 193-194. 
46
 "Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report [Excerpt]," Global Security org (2002), 
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or its allies/friendly countries—the George W. Bush administration urged other countries to 
strengthen their defensive power, and promoted cooperation with its allies and friends to this 
end.47 
2.5 Conclusion 
BMD has a history of more than fifty years. In particular, the U.S. has been working 
on developing BMD since the end of WWII. Today, the number of the countries involved in 
BMD issues is increasing. This is worrisome because BMD is not simply another military 
system; it has the possibility to alter fundamentally the balance of power and military 
strategies that depend on nuclear weapons. 
47
 Joseph Cirincione, "Political and Strategic Imperatives of National Missile Defense," Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (2000), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=614 
(accessed January 14, 2009). 
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Chapter III: A BMD Comparative Study - Literature Review and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of the BMD literature and explains my methodology. 
The literature review describes the two major research perspectives on BMD issues— 
technological and social scientific—from which I drew materials for the two case studies, 
and situates my research within the BMD literature. The methodology section outlines my 
approach to my comparative study, and explains why I used Putnam's two-level game theory 
as the basis for structuring the comparison. 
3.2 Literature Review 
BMD is a relatively new topic of research among international relations scholars. It 
began around the middle of the 1980s. Even after 20 years of research, there are few 
scholarly social science studies that comprehensively cover the full range of perspectives 
related to BMD—historical, technological, political, economic, and military. 
Overall, the field is dominated by technological literature. This literature primarily 
examines engineering-related issues such as technical feasibility and effectiveness; for 
example, the mechanical structure and effectiveness of PAC-3 systems. I referred to this type 
of material to understand the technology of BMD systems, using especially those documents 
that lay-translated technical information. Some of the technological literature discusses the 
political implications of BMD technology. Works of this orientation that I drew upon for my 
research include Nobuyuki Nose's IT 5 1 M / ^ f f : 0 ^ t t # J ^ if 5 iLhftfr 5 <D 
#\J] , Misairu Boei: Nihon wa Kyoi ni do Tachimukaunoka {Missile Defense: How should 
22 
Japan Defend against Threats);4* and Kensuke Ebata's ft 0 # £ > B£$tf$«B& : i i f Pf <£>#f fc 
t£i£:f£ 1Slf/i J , Nihon no Boei Senryaku: Jieitai no Arata na Ninmu to Sobi (Japan's 
Defense Strategy: Japanese Self-Defense Force's Future Duties and Organization); 
Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense published by the U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office;50 and various U.S. MDA publications including "Ballistic Missile Defense 
Overview."51 
A smaller portion of the BMD literature revolves around social science research. This 
is the literature that I drew upon most heavily. Most social scientific research concentrates on 
American BMD policies, including analyses of decision-making processes, alliance issues 
with the U.S. over BMD policies and strategies, perspectives on the threat of missile attacks, 
and international and regional relations as they related to BMD systems. The focus on the 
U.S. is not surprising because the U.S. was the first to develop BMD systems and possesses 
the most sophisticated systems today. Some of the key works in this literature are the 
following. 
Frances FitzGerald's Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of 
the Cold War focuses on a history of BMD politics, especially Reagan's SDL52 Earnest J. 
Yanerella's The Missile Defense Controversy: Technology in Search of a Mission introduces 
the origins of ABM systems up to the ABMT. He points out that the same scenarios have 
48
 Nobuyuki Nose, Misaim Boei: Nihon wa Kyoi ni doTachimukaunoka (Missile Defense: How should Japan 
Defend against Threats) (Tokyo: Shincho-sha Press, 2007). 
49
 Kensuke Ebata, Nihon no Boei Senryaku: Jieitai no Arata na Ninmu to Sobi (Japan's Defense Strategy: 
Japanese Self-Defense Force's Future Duties and Organization) (Tokyo: Diamond-sha press, 2007). 
50
 Congress of the United Sates, Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense 
(Washington, D.C.: National Government Publications, 2004). 
51
 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview," (2008), http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf. 
52
 Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: 
Simon & Schuster Press, 2000). 
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repeated through the Reagan to the George W. Bush administrations. He believes that U.S. 
BMD systems are not technically advanced nor feasible, and that the U.S. passion to build a 
BMD system is similar to a neurotic quest.53 William Dudley's Missile Defense focuses on 
the combined factors of the technological feasibility and geopolitical ramifications of BMD 
systems.54 
These authors and other social scientists researching BMD issues tend to focus on 
variables related to the origin of BMD under the Cold War structure, on analysis of missile 
defense technologies and their political implications for world affairs, on theoretical analysis 
revolving around deterrence theory, and on geopolitical, diplomatic and military relations 
between the U.S. and other countries. Majority of these scholars are critical of U.S. BMD 
policy and the impact it will have on international society because they tend to believe that 
BMD will deteriorate into an arms race and destabilize the balance of power in international 
politics. 
There are also social science studies focusing on other countries such as Australia, 
China, Europe, India, Russia and South Korea, besides Canada and Japan. For example, Sam 
Roggeyeen discusses Australian missile defense based on the U.S. BMD strategies;55 Brad 
Roberts investigates Chinese BMD issues;56 Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek have written on 
long-range BMD issues in Europe;57 Ashley J. Tellis covers India and BMD;58 Miriam D. 
53
 Yanerella, The Missile Defense Controversy. 
54
 William Dudley, Missile Defense (Chicago: Greenhaven Press, 2002). 
55
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2010). 
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Analysis (2003), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf (accessed April 9, 2010). 
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Service (2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34051.pdf (accessed April 9, 2010). 
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Becker analyzes BMD issues between Russia and the U.S. ; and Jenny Shin focuses on 
South Korea and BMD issues. ° Other works with a focus on more than one country include: 
Yoshihide Soeya et al. who cover the triangular relationship between the U.S., China and 
Japan,61 and Stanley Sloan who examines BMD in relation to Europe and NATO.62 
In this thesis, I conducted a comparative study: U.S.-Japan compared to U.S.-Canada. 
There does not seem to be any such scholarly analysis of this type in the BMD literature. To 
my knowledge, the research in this thesis is the first such comparative analysis. In the two 
sections below, I briefly review the BMD literature related to Japan and Canada. 
The Case of Japan 
In Japan, regional and international military issues were taboo topics after the defeat 
of WWII. This taboo more or less continued until the end of the Cold War. Thus, Japanese 
BMD research from a social science perspective is very recent, beginning only in the early 
2000s. 
For the Japanese case study, I relied mainly on documents from four organizations: 
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
RAND Corporation, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). The Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, when it covers BMD issues, tends to focus on the technological 
Ashely J. Tellis, India and Missile Defense (Washington D.C.: Camegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2007). 
59
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60
 Jenny Shin, "The Concern with South Korea's Missile Defense System," Center of Defense Information 
(2009), 
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aspects; however, their writing is accessible to a lay audience. The authors in Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists tend to concentrate their analysis on governments or ministries, such as 
Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD) or the U.S. DOD. Generally, they are skeptical of 
governments' BMD policies and decisions. The CRS produces analyses of contemporary and 
emerging issues for members of the U.S. Congress. It has published on the implications of 
BMD policies and decisions for U.S. national security, including U.S.-Japan relations. They 
have deep connections with the U.S. government and tend to be rooted in realist thinking. 
The CRS reports also provide reliable coverage of a wide range of public opinion polls. The 
RAND Corporation, a non-profit institute originally established by the U.S. Air Force, 
conducts a wide range of research primarily focused on national security issues, including 
those related to Japan.63 Its military-related articles and reports are solid and tend toward 
realist thinking. The JIIA is a research institute associated with the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that produces and publishes pieces related to Japanese foreign policy and 
international relations.64 It is generally considered a trustworthy think tank offering 
comprehensive scholarly works to the Japanese public. However, because the JIIA has a 
strong connection with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in many cases, its articles and books 
are supportive of the governments' positions. 
For my research, I drew extensively from two books published by the JIIA. The first 
was r ^ i M / H & f i S : f fL l^ [S^^^ f£P i<7) fS0J , Misairu Bdei: Atarashii Kokusai 
Anzen Hosho no Kozu {Missile Defense: New Design for International Security), edited by 
63
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Satoshi Morimoto and published in 2002. Morimoto is a professor of international security 
at Takushoku University. The book contains fifteen chapters, of which seven were relevant to 
my research theme. The book's basic premise is that BMD is important for Japanese national 
security; hence, comprehensive analysis on BMD should be conducted but it is as yet 
insufficient.66 The authors do not analyze and evaluate from a wide range of perspectives 
regarding the types of positive and negative political impacts that would result from joining 
the U.S. BMD program and deploying BMD systems. They argue that BMD systems are 
necessary for Japan to defend itself, and that cooperation with the U.S. and the U.S.-led 
BMD program needs to be a central strategy for Japan. The book supports a realist position 
relative to Japan's security and BMD. 
The second book I drew from was IT 0 #<D ^ ^4 ?\^VM : ^MiT5 f c l W ^ T 
(O^Y7^. - ^ik\^W$k.Wt& , Nihon no Misairu Boei: Henyo Suru Senryaku Kankyoka no 
Gaiko/Anzen Hosho Seisaku (Japanese Missile Defense: Diplomatic and Security Policies in 
an Evolving Strategic Environment), edited by Hideaki Kaneda et al. published in 2006.67 
Kaneda works at the Okazaki Research Institute and the Mitsubishi Research Institute as an 
expert on military technologies and policies. The book emphasizes the importance of 
introducing and deploying BMD systems in Japan, and focuses on deterrence against 
Northeast Asian regional threats. In this respect, it also assumes a realist viewpoint. The book 
is similar in style to the previously discussed book, Missile Defense: New Design for 
International Security. 
65
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In summary, in the case of Japan, the materials I used reflected sources both rooted in 
realist thinking (CRS, RAND Cooperation, and the JIIA reports) and liberal thinking (The 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists). This helped me avoid bias in either realist or liberal thinking in 
my analysis. 
The Case of Canada 
There are numerous studies of bilateral security and military relations between 
Canada and the U.S. For my research, I used research by both Canadian and American 
authors found in publications such as the Canadian Military Journal (the official professional 
journal of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defense), Canadian Security 
Intelligence, and CRS reports. Articles in the Canadian Military Journal tend to be biased 
toward Canada joining the U.S. BMD program; some authors clearly oppose Canada's 
decline in participation in the program after 2005. Articles in Canadian Security Intelligence 
also tend to focus on protecting Canada's national security interests. Thus, both journals are 
rooted in realist thinking. Two books I used extensively for the Canadian perspective on 
BMD were Michael Byers' Intent for a Nation: What is Canada for?, published in 2007,68 
and Steven Staples' Missile Defense: Round One, published in 2006.69 Byers is a professor of 
political science at the University of British Columbia. His book covers various international 
and bilateral issues between Canada and the U.S., including BMD. He focuses on the 
Canadian federal government and its decision-making, and explains the risks to Canada of 
joining the U.S. BMD program, especially in terms of keeping freedom of action in 
international affairs.70 Byers' thinking is decidedly liberal; he is skeptical of BMD. Staples 
68
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was working at the Polaris Institute as an expert on security when he published his book. The 
Polaris Institute is a left-learning think tank which addresses security and political issues in 
Canada. His book explains the background of BMD in North America, domestic politics and 
BMD issues in Canada, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) influence on the Canadian 
government's decision-making on BMD issues. He concludes that BMD does not benefit 
Canada's national interests and he is clearly against the U.S. BMD program. He is a strong 
supporter of Canada's humanitarian and liberal internationalist policies. 
I also used chapters from Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel's Fifty Years of 
Canada-United States Defense Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg, published in 
1992.71 This book describes defense cooperation between Canada and the U.S. from the early 
1940s. It is useful for understanding the defense partnership between Canada and the U.S., 
including the NORAD treaty and NATO, and the Canada-U.S. historical context. 
In summary, in the case of Canada, I used materials rooted in both realist thinking 
(Canadian Military Journal and Canadian Security Intelligence) and liberal thinking (Byers 
and Staples). Again, this helped me avoid bias in either realist or liberal thinking in my 
analysis. 
3.3 Methodology 
Because, to my knowledge, there are no comparative analyses using multiple-case 
studies in the BMD field that I could utilize for my study, I developed a simple qualitative 
method. It is qualitative because it does not contain numerical analysis. A qualitative 
71
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methodology is "a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification 
in the collection and analysis of data." 
As mentioned in Chapter I, since I could not find in the BMD literature a coherent set 
of variables used to explain BMD decisions, I employed an inductive approach to my 
analysis. The inductive approach implies working from particulars to generalizations. In my 
situation, I extracted variables from the case study literature that were used by the various 
authors to explain BMD decision-making and then searched for patterns (generalizations) 
among these variables. Thus, instead of starting with a given framework and applying it to 
my case studies, I started with the case studies and derived from them a framework. However, 
I did develop an overarching organizing structure with which to approach the case studies 
which consisted of two aspects: (1) organization of historical trends, and (2) division of 
found variables into two classes based on Putnam's work, international and domestic 
variables. 
My classification of variables/factors was inspired by Putnam's "two-level game 
theory."73 Putnam states that "the two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of domestic 
conflict about what the 'national interest' requires" and "that central decision-makers strive 
to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously."74 I believe that this 
approach is advantageous as a starting point for organizing my factors because decision-
making by Japan and Canada relative to participation in the U.S. BMD program was 
influenced by both international and domestic factors. Analyzing both the international and 
domestic levels allowed me to more accurately assess the process by which Japan's and 
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Canada's BMD decisions were arrived at. Thus, I examined Japan-U.S. and Canada-U.S. 
BMD relations and decision-making from two perspectives: external (international) and 
internal (domestic). The external perspective generally highlights realist-based international 
relations between the countries; specifically, Japan's and Canada's political and military 
alliance relations with the U.S. The internal perspective highlights domestic factors; 
specifically, domestic politics within Japan and Canada. The case of Japan is contained in 
Chapter IV, and the case of Canada in Chapter V. Chapter VI compares the two case studies. 
My research was conducted chiefly using secondary sources, including government 
publications, military documents, scholarly books, academic articles, newspaper articles, and 
web-data found on the websites of the U.S. MDA and Japan's MOD. It is from these sources 
that I extracted historical trends and a collection of explanatory variables/ factors. 
Chapter IV, V and VI are each divided into three sections. The first section is a 
chronological explanation of BMD issues from the 1980s to 2008 relevant to the case study 
countries. Japan's and Canada's BMD policy-making processes share a similar chronology. 
The description of the BMD decision-making processes for both countries is divided into 
three periods. In the case of Japan, the first period spans from the mid-1980s to 1990, the 
second period from 1990 to 2003, and the third period from 2003 to 2008. In the case of 
Canada, the first period spans from the mid-1980s to 1990, the second period from 1990 to 
2005, and the third period from 2005 to 2008. For both countries, the first period marks the 
beginning of their involvement in BMD through the Reagan administration's SDL During the 
second period, their paths, though similar at the beginning, began to diverge and, by the early 
to mid-2000s, they had arrived at opposite decisions regarding their participation in the U.S. 
BMD program. And, during the third period (after their respective decisions), both countries 
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maintained their stance through the end of the Bush administration. The chronological 
division into three periods facilitated comparative analysis between Japan and Canada. 
The second section contains an analysis of external (international) relations with the 
U.S.; specifically, bilateral political and military alliance relations. I identify and examine the 
international factors that help explain BMD decision-making and interactions among the 
primary actors. The third section contains an analysis of internal (domestic) relations; 
specifically, the domestic BMD politics within Japan and Canada. I identify and examine the 
domestic factors that help explain BMD decision-making and interactions among the primary 
actors. 
3.4 Realism and Liberal Internationalism 
The final step of my analysis was to link the set of factors I identified to international 
relations theories that explain state behavior. The two most relevant theories were realism 
and liberal internationalism. Each is briefly discussed. 
Realism postulates that the fundamental units in international politics are states, that 
states exist in an international system characterized by anarchy, that they must therefore 
always be on guard to protect and defend themselves, which means they must prioritize 
enhancing their political and military power as the surest way to ensure survival.75 Survival 
in the international system is a continual "struggle for power."76 The realist perspective is 
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mainly based on pessimistic ideas regarding international politics. Realism can be used to 
explain BMD decisions because of the stark security/survival purpose of BMD systems. In 
particular, once I had identified factors explaining Japan's and Canada's BMD decisions, I 
asked myself if the factors were related to realism or not. 
Liberal internationalism, on the other hand, tends to emphasize cooperation over 
conflict.78 Cooperative efforts and institutions are encouraged such as democratic systems, 
the United Nations (UN), and those governing global trade and finance. Multilateralism is 
preferred over isolation or bilateralism. In general, liberal internationalists seek to avoid the 
negative consequences of power politics. Compared to realism, liberalism takes a more 
positive view of international politics. Liberal internationalism can explain decisions 
especially when states seek to avoid BMD systems. Once I had identified factors explaining 
Japan's and Canada's BMD decisions, I asked myself if the factors were related to liberal 
internationalism or not. This theory applied only to Canada's BMD decisions. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a review of the BMD literature and the literature that I used 
for my case studies. It also contained an explanation of the methodology used to analyze the 
case studies. The next two chapters are the case studies of Japan and Canada, respectively. 
Following this, the two case studies are compared in Chapter VI. 
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Chapter IV: The Case of Japan 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I identify and analyze the reasons why the government of Japan chose 
to cooperate with the U.S.-led BMD program. Following the methodology outlined in the 
previous chapter, Section 4.2 presents background and a chronology of BMD politics based 
on Japan's domestic political issues and its international relations with the U.S. from 1983 to 
2008. Section 4.3 focuses on the international level of analysis, and Section 4.4 on the 
domestic level. Section 4.5 presents the answers to my central question: Why did Japan 
choose to join the U.S.-led BMD program as an active cooperative country in 2003? I 
conclude that four international-related factors and two domestic-related factors best explain 
Japanese BMD foreign policy decision-making, and that these factors suggest this decision-
making was rooted in realist thinking. 
4.2 Chronology of Japanese-American BMD Relations 
This section introduces background and a chronology divided into three periods. The 
first period, from 1983 to 1990, covers the time span during which Japan first became 
involved in BMD (in 1983) to the end of the Cold War (around 1990). The central feature of 
this period is the Japanese government's unofficial and conditional participation with the U.S. 
SDL The second period, from 1990 to 2003, covers the time span during which BMD 
became a central issue in Japan-U.S. bilateral relations. During this period, the Japanese and 
U.S. governments began official opinion exchanges regarding BMD issues. A tipping point 
was a North Korean missile test in 1998 which propelled Japan and the U.S. to move toward 
greater BMD cooperation. Japan officially joined the program in 2003. The third period, 
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from 2003 to 2008, covers the time span during which Japan began deployment of BMD 
systems. The period ends with the election of Barak Obama in 2008. 
Period 1: Beginning of BMD Relations, 1983 to 1990 
Japan's initial involvement in the U.S. BMD program began with SDI, established by 
the Reagan Administration in 1983. In the 1980s, Japan did not perceive any specific missile 
threats; however, the Japanese government felt it was in its national interest to be involved in 
SDI. Even though then-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone was strongly interested in 
Reagan's BMD framework, his party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), did not fully 
support it because of opposition parties' and the mass media's opposition to BMD.80 Also, 
the government worried about neighboring countries' reactions,81 and about violating the 
ABMT.82 The Japanese government eventually decided to partially participate in SDI in 1986 
subject to four conditions: 
• establishment of a framework for private sector participation, 
• freedom of private companies to enter or leave the program, 
• case-by-case decisions on participation by government agencies, and 
• a guarantee that secrets-protection legislation83 would not be passed in the U.S.84 
The Japanese government continued informal opinion exchanges with the U.S. government 
over BMD issues for the remainder of the 1980s. 
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During this period, the Japanese government encouraged an active role by private 
companies, such as Mitsubishi Juko Prime (Mitsubishi Heavy Industry), in joint SDI 
research.85 For example, from 1989 to 1993 Japanese private companies and the U.S. 
government conducted the Western Pacific Missile Defense Architecture Study 
(WESTPAC).86 WESTPAC was a joint research project designed to examine the technical 
feasibility of defense of Japan and the Western Pacific from D.P.R.K. ballistic missile attacks. 
The end of Period 1 is marked by the end of the Cold War around 1990. This 
dramatically changed the international security environment. BMD became one of the many 
elements of military strategy that underwent revision. 
Period 2: Expansion of BMD Relations, 1990 to 2003 
BMD gradually became an increasingly important factor in the Japan-U.S. bilateral 
alliance throughout the 1990s. The Gulf War occurred in 1990. The U.S. criticized Japan 
during this war for failing to fulfill its responsibilities as a U.S. ally. Japan therefore felt 
pressure to demonstrate its commitment to the U.S., which it could do, for example, through 
cooperation on BMD. In 1993, the D.P.R.K. test-fired its Nodong-1 missile into the Sea of 
Japan. This pushed BMD higher on the alliance agenda. In 1994, the U.S.-Japan Bilateral 
Study on Ballistic Missile Defense was agreed to. It focused on "extensive simulation and 
systems analysis to identify and evaluate various alternative missile defense architectures."87 
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In 1995, Japan engaged in two research projects: "Synthetic Research on Japan's Air Defense 
System" and "Joint Research of Japan-U.S. BMD."88 
Cooperation further elevated after the D.P.R.K. test-fired its Taepodong-1 missile in 
1998. The missile flew over northern Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean. This event 
dramatically altered Japanese perceptions of ballistic missile threats.89 Interest in introducing 
a TMD system in Japan increased.90 In 1998, the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet 
Council approved a research project called the "Japan-U.S. Joint Technology Research 
Related to BMD."91 It focused on Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD). In 1999, the 
Japanese government signed a Joint Cooperative Research (JCR) agreement with the U.S. on 
BMD.92 
In 1998, the Japanese government announced three possible steps in its promotion of 
a BMD system: (1) lUfSc • M^t, chosa • kenkyu (investigation and research); (2) |§^§, 
kaihatsu (development); and (3) J t H • SSf/i, ryosan • haibi (mass production and 
deployment).93 Although the Japanese government had already been in the stage of the first 
step, it was not sure at this time if it would advance to the second and third steps.94 It sought 
to maintain political flexibility to be able to choose its future involvement.95 In 1999, the 
Clinton administration signed the National Missile Defense Act to deploy NMD systems as 
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soon as technically feasible. As a result, pressure on Japan to cooperate on BMD began to 
rise. In 2000, the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet Council of Japan decided to 
establish a "Mid-Term Defense Program (2001-2007)" and continue Japan-U.S. joint 
97 
research focused on NTWD. 
The Junichiro Koizumi administration (2001-2006) formally committed Japan to the 
U.S. BMD program. Masako Toki states: "[Prime Minister Koizumi] made missile defense a 
cornerstone of the country's security policy."98 The Cabinet claimed that BMD met Japan's 
constitutional principle of "exclusively defense oriented policy"; hence, its decision was 
constitutionally legal." Many Japanese government officials came to accept BMD as a 
realistic approach to regional threats.100 In addition, U.S. military involvements in 
Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 influenced Japan's interests in bilateral military 
cooperation because the Japanese government worried that American interests and 
commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region would fade due to these two wars in the 
Middle East. 
In 2002, President Bush announced plans for initial NMD deployment in the U.S. 
Following this, the Japanese Cabinet stated in 2003 that the technical feasibility of BMD had 
greatly improved as a result of partially successful U.S. interception tests.101 The government 
thereafter proclaimed a policy termed Dando Misairu Boei Shisutemu no Seibi-to ni Tsuite 
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(Introduction of a BMD System and Other Measures) that laid the groundwork for potential 
deployment of a BMD system in Japan.102 Its objectives were: 
• interception of ballistic missiles fired at Japan, 
• prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 
• strategic deterrence against ballistic missile attacks, and 
• contribution to the U.S. BMD program.103 
Japan set forth plans to construct TMD systems, including NTWD and PAC-3, for 
multi-layered missile defense in both "upper and lower tiers."104 NTWD is designed to 
intercept ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase at an altitude of more than 100 km outside 
the atmosphere, and PAC-3 is for intercepting ballistic missiles in the terminal phase at an 
altitude of less than 100 km in the lower tier. These were considered the most appropriate 
BMD systems for Japan.105 
Thus, during Period Two, Japanese cooperation with the U.S. on BMD research 
slowly but surely increased in the early part of the period, took a major upswing after the 
1998 North Korean missile test, and culminated in a formal declaration to join the program in 
2003. 
Period 3: Official BMD Relations, 2003 to 2008 
Between 2004 and 2005, the U.S. deployed eight interceptors in Alaska and 
California.106 In 2005 Japan moved forward on the development phase of BMD.107 In 2006, 
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the D.P.R.K again tested missiles and, soon after, Japan proceeded to the deployment 
phase.108 The then-Japan Defense Agency (JDA; in 2006 it became MOD) Director-General 
Fukushiro Nukaga announced that PAC-3 units would be deployed at Iruma Base (Saitama 
Prefecture), Kasumigaura (Ibaraki Prefecture), Narashiro (Chiba Prefecture), and Takeyama 
(Kanagawa Prefecture).109 In 2006, a U.S. X-Band Radar system was deployed at Shariki air 
base in the northern prefecture of Aomori, and a PAC-3 unit at Kadena air base in Okinawa 
Prefecture.110 By 2007, Japan had included in its budget major BMD weapon systems 
including 16 PAC-3 units and 4 Aegis systems.1'' A PAC-3 unit was deployed at Iruma Air 
Base in Saitama Prefecture near Tokyo in 2007, and in 2008 Japan completed deployment 
of four more PAC-3 units near Tokyo.113 
Also in 2007, Japan addressed inconsistencies between its 1969 "Resolution on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space" relative to deploying the Aegis-BMD systems. Japan's 1969 
Resolution prohibits it from using outer space for military purposes. An Aegis-BMD system 
would violate this resolution since the Aegis system is designed to intercept missiles in outer 
space in the mid-course phase. The government therefore passed in 2007 a "Basic Space 
Law." The original Resolution on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space allows Japan to use outer 
space only for non-military purposes. The Basic Space Law changed the language to 
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"nonaggressive" purposes.114 The law interprets that space technologies such as satellites and 
Aegis systems can be developed for self-defense purposes.115 Soon after, in 2008, an Aegis-
equipped destroyer, Kongo, was deployed for the first time (at the Seabo naval base in 
Nagasaki Prefecture). Currently, the Japanese and U.S. governments are scheduled to 
complete deployment of TMD systems in Japan by 2011. 
Summary 
Table 4.1 displays a chronology of Japan's involvement in the U.S.-led BMD 
program, highlighting Japan's increasing commitment from the mid-1980s to 2008. 
Table 4.1 Chronology of Japan-U.S. BMD Relations 
Year Event 
PERIOD 1 (1983-1990) 
1983 U.S. President Reagan proposes SDI 
Japanese and U.S. governments begin informal opinion exchanges over 
BMD issues 
1986 Japanese government announces conditional participation in SDI 
1989 Japanese private companies enter into contracts with the U.S. 
government, e.g., WESTPAC 
PERIOD 2 (1990-2003) 
1993 D.P.R.K. fires a Nodong-1 missile into the Sea of Japan 
1994 Japanese government initiates "diversified security theory" 
U.S.-Japan Bilateral Study on BMD is agreed upon. Study focuses on 
extensive simulation and system analysis 
114
 Yumiko Myoken, "The Bill of Basic Space Law," British Embassy: Science and Innovation Section (2008): 
4. Basic Space Law is composed of three main pillars: (1) "reinforcing Japan's security through the 
development and utilization of space," (2) "promoting space-research and development," and (3) "developing 
Japan's space industry." 
115
 Toki, "Missile Defense in Japan," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2009), http://www.thebulletin.org/web-
edition/features/missile-defense-japan (accessed March 9, 2009). 
41 
1995 Japan starts two research projects: "Synthetic Examination Research 
regarding Japan's Air Defense System" and "Joint Research on Japan-
U.S. BMD" 
1998 D.P.R.K. tests Taepodong-1 missile which flies over northern Japan and 
lands in the Pacific Ocean 
Security Council of Japan and Cabinet Council approve the "Japan-U.S. 
Joint Technology Research Related to BMD" focusing on NTWD 
1999 Clinton Administration signs the National Missile Defense Act to 
deploy a NMD system as soon as technologically proven 
Japan begins joint research related to targeting capability-improved 
intercept missiles 
2000 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet Council establish the "Mid-Term 
Defense Program (2001-2007)" 
Japan decides to continue Japan-U.S. joint technology research focused 
on NTWD 
2001 September 11 terrorist attacks 
2002 Bush administration announces its plan for initial deployment of BMD 
systems in Alaska and California 
2003 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet Council approve the 
"Introduction of a BMD System and Other Measures" 
PERIOD 3 (2003-2008) 
2003 Cabinet claims that BMD meets Japan's principles of "exclusively 
defense oriented policy" 
2004 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet Council establish the National
 e 
Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and New Mid-Term Defense 
Program 
Japanese government alters its National Defense Program Guidelines 
(NDPG) to imply that Japan's Three Principles on Arms Export and 
related provisions could be modified for the future deployment of BMD 
systems 
Japanese government decides to continue its "BMD maintenance" 
program 
Japan decides to move forward with measures for potential transition 
from investigation/research to development of a BMD system 
2005 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet Council adopt plan for "Japan-
U.S. joint development regarding capability-improved style intercept 
missiles for BMD" 
2006 D.P.R.K. fires seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan 
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X-Band Radar system deployed at Shariki air base in Aoyama 
Prefecture 
PAC-3 unit deployed at Kadena air base in Okinawa Prefecture 
Public poll conducted by the Cabinet Office shows 25 percent of the 
respondents support BMD policy 
2007 PAC-3 unit deployed at Iruma Air Base in Saitama Prefecture 
Aegis-equipped destroyer Kongo succeeds in test of blastoff capabilities 
ofSM-3 
Basic Space Law passed 
2008 Kongo is deployed at Seabo base in Nagasaki Prefecture 
2011 Japanese and U.S. governments plan to complete deployment of TMD 
systems in Japan 
4.3 Analysis of External Factors: International BMD Politics 
In this section, four external (international) factors influencing Japan's BMD 
decisions are identified and analyzed. These factors were chosen because they represent the 
most common international factors stated in the sources I used. In turn, they reflect the major 
alliance issues between Japan and the U.S. in each period from the 1980s to the 2000s. Hence, 
the process of developing BMD relations between the two countries was deeply influenced 
by these major alliance issues. The four factors are treated in more or less chronological 
order. There is overlap in some of the factors; however, each retains sufficient distinctness to 
be treated as a separate influence. 
Easing Economic Friction 
In the first period (1983-1990), Japan did not perceive any specific missile threats;116 
however, it chose to be involved in Reagan's SDI. One reason was that cooperation on SDI 
116
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served to ease economic and trade frictions with the U.S.117 During the 1980s, trade friction 
between Japan and the U.S. became a significant element of their bilateral relations. In 
particular, trade deficits were attributed to Japan's export of automobiles to the U.S. The U.S. 
attempted to rein in Japan's exports to the U.S. and expand its own exports to Japan. The 
trade issue became overheated and politicized. The U.S. increasingly accused Japan of free 
riding on military security.118 The U.S. argued that one way for Japan to counter free riding 
was "to contribute technological expertise and funding, and to serve as a customer" for the 
American BMD system.119 Thus, cooperation on SDI was a means of moderating U.S. 
concern over its trade deficit. 
Trade friction between Japan and the U.S. continued during the 1990s, including U.S. 
further criticism of Japan's free riding on U.S. military technology.120 When the Clinton 
administration began moving forward with TMD research and development, then-Secretary 
of Defense Les Aspin urged in 1993 the Japanese government's formal participation,121 
arguing that it would be effective to decrease the trade surplus with the U.S.122 
Economic issues in the Japan-U.S. relationship gradually became less important from 
the middle of the 1990s, and during the 2000s, trade and economic friction between the U.S. 
and Japan has not been as intense. This is in part due to the rapid rise of the Chinese 
economy. Instead of Japan, the U.S. now encounters huge trade deficits with China. Hence, 
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easing economic frictions more or less disappeared as an element in BMD politics during the 
2000s. 
Resolving Alliance Dilemmas 
Efforts to resolve alliance security dilemmas are a significant factor that helps explain 
Japan's decision to join the U.S. BMD program. The Japanese-American military alliance 
exhibits typical alliance security dilemmas. According to Glenn H. Snyder, an "alliance 
security dilemma" arises because of two major fears: "abandonment" and "entrapment."123 
He argues that abandonment means fear of defection. For example, each ally is concerned 
that the partner will realign and form a new and different alliance with an opponent, or end 
the alliance, or fail to build strong commitments to each other.124 Entrapment is the fear of 
"being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interest."125 Japan and the U.S. experienced both 
fears relative to each other. 
The Japanese government cooperated with SDI during the 1980s in part because it 
believed it would be a symbol of solidarity as a responsible ally.126 This orientation 
continued during the 1990s. In the post-Cold War era, both Japan's and the U.S.'s main goal 
was to reaffirm and strengthen the U.S.-Japan security treaty; however, there were strains. In 
the early 1990s, the Japanese government created a new security strategy termed takakuteki 
anzen hosho-ron (diversified-security theory). In 1994, the Morihiro Hosokawa 
administration (1993-1994) formed the Bdei Mondai Kondankai (Advisory Group on 
Defense Issues) headed by Hirotaro Higuchi in order to redefine Japan's security policy. In 
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1994, the group submitted its report, known as the Higuchi Report. It emphasized the 
significance of diversified-security cooperation, and pointed out that Japan has to have an 
active and constructive role in international society, for instance cooperating with the UN, 
while at the same time maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as a core element of its 
foreign policy.128 
However, the U.S. interpreted Japan's new security strategy as potential abandonment 
of the bilateral alliance because of the threat that Japan may prioritize the UN and other 
relations over U.S. relations. To prevent abandonment, the U.S. began to encourage Japan to 
increase its military cooperation with the U.S.129 The U.S. feared abandonment because 
Japan is a critical "power projection platform" for U.S. worldwide military strategy and 
operations.130 This role is based not only on its geographical location but also its high 
industrial standard.131 According to the U.S. DOD, it is impossible to maintain its worldwide 
military posture and strategy without Japan's cooperation.132 
Even though Japan began to construct its new security policy based on two different 
concepts (diversified security theory and the bilateral alliance with the U.S.), it prioritized the 
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Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as the core element.133 The major reason was that Japan believed 
it could not defend itself without U.S. military protection. Japan in this regard feared 
abandonment by the U.S., especially after being criticized by the U.S. for its seemingly 
insufficient contribution to the 1990-1991 Gulf War.134 Despite Japan's enormous financial 
support, the U.S. criticized Japan as doing "too little, too late." The U.S. was especially 
critical of Japan's inability to send the Self Defense Forces (SDFs) to support U.S. forces 
deployed in the Persian Gulf.135 
To prevent abandonment by the U.S. and to contribute to multilateral security, Japan 
for the first time cleared the way for its participation in international peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs). The Japanese Diet passed an International PKO Law in June 1992 which allowed it 
to send SDFs to foreign countries.136 This legal revision expanded Japan's military 
contribution to the U.S. efforts. Coupled with cooperation on BMD, it helped relieve the 
mutual fear of abandonment. 
From the early 2000s, on Japan's side fear of abandonment was gradually replaced by 
a fear of entrapment. Snyder argues that "the greater one's dependence on the alliance and 
the stronger one's commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment."137 Public 
opinion polls showed that the Japanese public perceived a risk of entrapment in U.S. wars.138 
In a poll conducted by the Cabinet Office in 1994, 19% of the Japanese public thought the 
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risk of Japan's entrapment in wars was increasing, this jumped to 45% in 2006 139 Despite 
the perception of increasing risk of being entrapped, the Japanese government continued with 
BMD cooperation with the U S In 2005, then-Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura 
announced in New York "We [Japan and the U S ] have been working to strengthen the 
Japan-U S security arrangements, and our efforts include introduction of ballistic missile 
defense system as well as various legislative measures to cope with contingency 
situations "140 
Serving to Develop Japan's Military Capability 
Enhancing Japanese military capabilities is another factor that helps explain Japan's 
decisions on BMD Even though Japan and the U S had a 50-year history of a bilateral 
alliance, Japan still mostly depended on U S military technology BMD was a vehicle to 
introduce advanced U S military technologies to Japan In 1986, then-chief cabinet secretary 
of Japan, Knchi Miyazawa, stated "Japan's participation in the SDI research may contribute 
to the progress of related technologies in Japan "141 In the first and second periods, though, 
BMD research was for the most part conducted on a small scale and through private 
companies However, since 2003, when Japan formally joined the U S BMD program, it has 
been actively been engaged in developing sophisticated BMD systems such as the Aegis-
equipped destroyer Kongo and PAC-3 units 
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In addition to developing technological systems, Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation has 
also served to integrate Japan's SDFs because deployment and operation of a BMD system in 
Japan requires both bilateral interoperability with the U.S. and integration within, and 
reorganization of, Japan's Air, Ground, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces 
(JASDF/JGSDF/JMSDF).143 The SDFs currently have less-than-well-integrated command 
and control systems for their own ground, sea and air troops. A BMD system demands that 
the SDFs be integrated.144 Current systems which exist in JASDF/JGSDF/JMSDF are 
insufficient to operate under actual battles conditions in using BMD systems. For that 
function, Japan needs to construct new advanced command and control systems by 
reorganizing and integrating the three different forces.145 This domestic military 
reorganization within the SDFs is not only designed to advance Japan's own military 
capabilities but also meant to provide a platform for Japan and the U.S. to effectively 
cooperate on BMD in the future. Japan and the U.S. must cooperate to effectively respond to 
regional missile threats in Northeast Asia. In the event of a missile strike threat, the two 
countries will have to react rapidly. Thus, bilateral interoperability with the U.S. and 
integration within SDFs are key factors. 
In summary, there are two main factors related to Japan's military capabilities that 
help explain the Japanese government's BMD decisions. The first is domestic development 
and manufacture of BMD equipment and hence lessening of its dependence on U.S. military 
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technology, and the second is to force integration of its SDFs, which in turn will enhance 
Japan's overall military capabilities. 
Responding to Missile Threats 
The security environment in Northeast Asia became unstable after the end of the Cold 
War, and efforts to adjust to worrisome trends were a major factor affecting Japan's BMD 
decisions. The D.P.R.K. tested its Nodong-1 missile in 1993, which fell into the Sea of Japan, 
and its Taepodong-1 in 1998, which flew over Japan's land territory, falling into the Pacific 
Ocean.146 These incidents caused public anxiety in Japan. In addition, China began to be 
considered a potential threat to Japan due to its rapid development and modernization of its 
military and nuclear missile capabilities. By the early 2000s, China had more than 100 
nuclear warheads in all ranges—short, medium and long—which were far more advanced 
than those of the D.P.R.K.147 
One effort to redefine the Japan-U.S. bilateral security alliance in the post-Cold War 
era was the 1996 "Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the Twenty-First Century."148 
It reaffirmed the significance of the bilateral military relationship, and confirmed cooperation 
to enhance deterrence and defense capabilities by promising to continue joint research on 
BMD.149 As BMD cooperation increased, it became clear that it had strategic implications 
relative to the United States Forces Japan (USFJ). A Japanese BMD system would be 
expected to play a role in protecting the USFJ from ballistic missile threats, and under 
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emergency circumstances would support USFJ military operations.150 Thus, Japan's BMD 
deployment would reinforce the effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence for both Japan and 
the USFJ, which in turn would be useful to deal with evolving regional security environment 
in Northeast Asia.151 
BMD deployment could counter threats perceived by Japan but it could also alter the 
strategic power balance among the major countries in Northeast Asia.152 China has 
consistently opposed the U.S. BMD program since the 1980s, and is strongly opposed to the 
expansion of Japan's military role through a BMD program because it may alter Japan's 
defense posture to an offensive one.153 Traditionally, China has maintained a minimum 
deterrence strategy, possessing only a small number of nuclear weapons that can cause 
significant retaliatory damage against an adversary's major cities.154 Besides threatening to 
neutralize China's overall nuclear arsenal, TMD development in Japan (and Taiwan) would 
change the regional security and military balance in the Taiwan Strait.155 
The D.P.R.K. also opposes the BMD program. The D.P.R.K.'s missile technology is 
inferior to that of China; however, its medium and intermediate-range missiles can reach 
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Japan.156 To Japan, North Korea is perceived as a more urgent threat than China because of 
missile tests in 1993, 1998, and 2006 that were conducted in close proximity to Japan. 
Even though Japan's BMD stance could provoke missile proliferation by China 
and/or the D.P.R.K., the Japanese MOD argues that BMD is a completely "defensive 
defense" system; thus, it will not threaten its neighbors.157 Although Japanese policy makers 
acknowledge China and North Korea's concerns, decisions were made to increase Japan's 
involvement in the U.S. BMD program from the 1980s onward. 
4.4 Analysis of Internal Factors: Domestic BMD Politics in Japan 
In this section, internal factors influencing Japan's BMD decisions are identified and 
analyzed. Again, these factors were chosen because they reflect the most common domestic 
factors as stated in the sources I used. The factors are treated in more or less chronological 
order of when they became important. There is overlap in some of the factors; however, each 
retains sufficient distinctness to be treated as a separate influence. 
Circumventing Constitutional Obstacles 
In order for Japan to join the U.S. BMD program, its involvement had to be 
compatible with its constitution. The Constitution of the State of Japan was enacted in 
1947.158 It is sometimes referred to as the "Peace Constitution", chiefly due to Article 9, 
Hideya Kurata, "Misairu Boei to Kankoku Sono Sentakuteki Donyu to 'Misairu Fukmko'," (Missile 
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which states that Japan renounces war and rejects maintaining any kind of offensive military 
force (armed forces with war potential).159 
The SDFs are a de facto military force established strictly for defense purposes in 
1954. The core of Japan's security framework is senshu bdei (defense-only military posture) 
was outlined in Kokubo no Kihon Hoshin (Basic Principles of National Defense) in 1957.160 
A "defense-only military posture" implies that Japan can mobilize the SDFs only after Japan 
is attacked. Even in the case of attack, Japan's counterattacks have to be limited to the 
minimum necessity to deter the attack.161 A second element of Japan's security framework is 
kibanteki boeiryoku koso (basic and standard defense capabilities), and was established in 
Bdei Keikaku no Taiko (National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)) in 1976.162 This was set 
forth to deter against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and enshrined a principle of 
maintaining a minimum necessary defense capability.163 
Because Japan has set strict self-regulation of its security and defense principles, 
questions arise as to the compatibility of these principles with Japan's involvement in BMD. 
First, Article 9 of the Constitution is interpreted as not including the right to collective self-
defense. Providing or sharing information with the U.S. related to missile defense would not 
Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, "The Constitution of Japan," 
httpV/www kantei go jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_ofjapan/constitution_e html (accessed June 15, 
2010) The official English version of Article 9 is as follows Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based 
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat 
or use of force as means of settling international disputes (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained The right of belligerency of 
the state will not be recognized 
160
 Yasuhiro Takeda, and Matake Kamiya ed Anzen Hosho-gaku Nyumon (Introduction to Security Study), 
(Tokyo Aki Shobo Press, 2005), 314 
161
 Ken Jimbo, "Atarashn Nihon no Anzen Hosho," (New Japanese Security", in Masahiro Sakamoto and 
Tadamasa Fukiura ed , Atarashi Nihon no Anzen Hosho wo Kangaeru (Consider New Japanese Security) 
(Tokyo' Jiyu Kokumin Press, 2003),68 
162
 Tsuyoshi Kawasaki,"Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy," The Pacific Review 14 
(2001)-230 
163
 Ibid (Kawasaki); Jinbo, Consider Japanese new security, 69 
53 
violate the constitution because it does not require the deployment of force; however, 
deployment of a BMD system may violate this principle. Second, can Japan intercept 
missiles in outer space'? According to the 1969 Resolution on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, the answer is "no." However, Japan-based BMD systems would have the ability to 
shoot down ballistic missiles in outer space 164 Third, can Japan intercept missiles in the 
boost phase7165 Since the boost phase is the earliest stage of interception soon after a missile 
launch, it is difficult to accurately judge where the missile is targeted. In the case that Japan 
intercepts a missile targeted against another country, it would go beyond its right of 
individual self-defense. Fourth, can Japan intercept missiles targeted at the USFJ7166 If so, 
Japan is protecting foreign troops. 
Resolving these issues has not been easy Even though in 2003 the Cabinet claimed 
that BMD met the principle of "exclusively defense-oriented policy",167 there was no clear 
political consensus on this among the political parties in Japan While the majority of the 
LDP members supported BMD, the Democratic Party of Japan (DP J) did not have a clear 
position.168 The New Komeito (NK) Party was suspicious of BMD because of the domestic 
legal issue of the right to collective self-defense, the China factor, costs and feasibility 169 
The NK Party believed that BMD deployment would violate Japan's self-restriction on 
collective self-defense, which would raise regional security tensions with China However, 
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the NK Party eventually sided with the LDP. The Social Democrats and the Communists 
were clearly opposed to BMD because they believe it violated Japan's Peace Constitution.170 
Even though incompatibilities exist between Article 9 and the BMD concept, Japan 
has not altered its constitution. Instead, the government has undertaken a series of what I call 
"modest amendments" by altering interpretations or creating exceptions.171 This modest 
amendment approach is another factor that helps explain Japan's decision to join the U.S. 
BMD program because it facilitated the government's ability to join the program without 
debilitating debate and opposition. 
One "modest amendment", as discussed above in Period 3, was to pass the Basic 
Space Law in 2007 to resolve the issue of non-military use of outer space as contained in the 
1969 Resolution on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Another example of a modest 
amendment relates to Japan's 1967 "Three Principles on Arms Exports" resolution.172 This 
resolution prohibits export of weapons and arms-related equipment to other countries. 
Japan's BMD cooperation with the U.S. might violate this because Japan would have to 
"export" any technological systems it developed to the U.S. To deal with this, in 2004 the 
Japanese government moderated the principles by excluding "joint development" from the 
restrictions, and stating that the resolution did not apply in situations where effective 
operational management of Japan-U.S. military systems would be impaired.173 
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Smoothing Japanese Public Reaction 
The Japanese public's mild opposition to BMD is another factor that helps explain 
Japan's decision to join the U.S. BMD program. The Japanese public became keenly 
interested in BMD after North Korea's Taepodong-1 missile was test fired over Japan in 
August 1998.m Despite this interest, immediately after this incident, only 43 percent of 
Japanese respondents in a public poll conducted by the U.S. Information Agency supported 
BMD cooperation with the U.S., while 32 percent opposed cooperation.175 In 2000, although 
57 percent showed a high level of concern regarding the North Korean missile issue, only 41 
percent favored BMD cooperation while 46 percent opposed.176 The U.S. CRS pointed out 
that "there seems to be a persistent lack of consensus [among Japanese people] on the 
desirability of cooperation with the U.S. on BMD development."177 
Ambiguity began to shift to support in 2001 for two reasons: first, the September 11 
attacks and second, then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's enthusiasm for BMD. 
As mentioned above, Koizumi accelerated Japan's participation in the BMD program, 
especially after the September 11 attacks.178 His support greatly affected Japanese public 
sentiment since he was a well-liked prime minister. According to a 2006 public poll 
conducted by the Cabinet Office, 25 percent of the respondents strongly supported the 
government's BMD policy and 32 percent mildly supported it.179 Even though "the vast 
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majority of the public remains largely uninformed about such critical issues as the technical 
capability, cost, feasibility, and possible international implications of BMD systems", the 
Japanese people have not strongly disagreed with the government's BMD decisions.180 Even 
after PAC-3 units were first deployed in 2007, the Japanese people and media did not make a 
huge fuss about it. Due to the Japanese public's passive reactions, the government has been 
able to advance its BMD cooperation with the U.S. without facing severe opposition. Hirata 
Keiko suggests that "judging from the overall trends of public attitudes toward national 
security, it is likely that public support for the BMD will continue in the future."181 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this section, I summarize the six factors that explain why Japan has chosen to 
cooperate with the U.S.-led BMD program, and discuss their historical influence leading to 
Japan's 2003 decision to formally join the program. 
First, easing economic friction with the U.S. helps explain Japan's decision. The 
Japanese government saw cooperation on SDI as a "political tool" to defuse trade-related 
criticism from the U.S. From the 1980s to the 1990s, Japan used modest support for the U.S. 
BMD system to demonstrate that it was not free riding on U.S. military spending and was 
responding to American trade deficit concerns. This orientation has continued in the 2000s 
although trade deficit issues are not the lightening rod they previously were. 
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Second, resolving security alliance issues with the U.S. helps explain Japan's decision. 
During the 1990s, both Japan and the U.S. recognized fear of abandonment, and began to use 
BMD in their alliance for strengthening their bilateral connection. From the 1990s to present, 
Japan believes that its BMD participation can create effective opportunities to demonstrate 
solidarity as a responsible ally. After formally joining the U.S. BMD program in 2003, the 
fear of abandonment issue was largely resolved. However, Japan began to experience a fear 
of entrapment due to its deeper involvement in President Bush's military adventures. Despite 
this, BMD relations with the U.S. became stronger. Fear of entrapment has largely dissipated 
since the election of President Obama. 
Third, strengthening Japan's military capabilities helps explain Japan's BMD 
cooperation with the U.S. because it is being used to (1) introduce advanced U.S. military 
technologies to Japan and foster indigenous development and manufacture of such 
technologies, and (2) promote integration and coordination among Japan's SDFs. Regarding 
military technologies and capabilities, Japan has been dependent on the U.S. since the end of 
WWII; however, through BMD cooperation Japan has been able to lessen this dependence to 
an extent. This serves to strengthen Japan's military self-reliance. The tighter integration and 
coordination of the SDFs demanded by deployment of BMD systems also strengthens 
Japan's military organization. Thus, overall, BMD cooperation is seen as enhancing Japan's 
military capabilities on multiple fronts. 
Fourth, responding to new post-Cold War security threats is a factor explaining 
Japan's decision to join the U.S. BMD program. When Japan first became involved in 
Regan's SDI in the mid-1980s, it did not perceive any specific regional missile threats. 
However, in the 1990s and more so in the 2000s, threats posed by its neighbors became more 
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serious, especially from China and the D.P.R.K. The Japanese government believed that 
BMD participation would be effective in building a deterrence posture to these regional 
threats. 
Fifth, circumventing constitutional and legal obstacles helps explain Japan's 2003 
decision. The Japanese government effectively used a "modest amendment" approach to 
blunt criticism from opponents of BMD. This approach was most prominent in the early 
2000s when the Japanese government first began its formal BMD involvement. 
Sixth, and related to factors already stated, a lack of strong opposition to BMD on the 
part of the Japanese public and media helps explain why the Japanese government was able 
to join the U.S. BMD program. This tendency holds for all three periods. Even after 
deployment began in 2006, public reaction was passive. 
Table 4.2 lists the six factors that I argue best explain why Japan chose to cooperate 
with the U.S. BMD program, and classifies each factor's influence during each of three time 
periods, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. I designated three levels of relative influence: weak (or 
none), medium, and strong. My assessment of the level of influence is subjective. It is based 
on my own judgment and on the strength and frequency of statements by various scholars 
and commentators as to the importance of each factor during the time periods. 
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Table 4.2 Factors Explaining Japan's Decisions to Cooperate with the U.S. BMD 
Program, and their Historical Influence 
Factors 1980s 1990s 2000s 
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
Easing Economic Friction 
Serving to Develop Japan's 
Military Capability 
Responding to Missile Threats 
Resolving Alliance Dilemmas 
Strong 
Weak 
Weak 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Strong 
Strong 
Weak 
Strong 
Strong 
Strong 
DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Circumventing Constitutional 
Obstacles 
Smoothing Japanese Public 
Reaction 
None 
Weak 
Weak 
Weak 
Strong 
Strong 
I am now in a position to answer one of my research questions: Why did Japan 
choose to join the U.S.-led BMD program as an active cooperative country in 2003? Japan 
decided to officially join the BMD program because of (1) the opportunity it provided to 
develop Japan's military capabilities, (2) the protection it offered to respond to new and 
rising security threats in the region, and (3) the ability it offered to resolve alliance dilemmas. 
Japan was politically able to join the program because (4) it was able to work around 
constitutional and legal obstacles, and (5) public opposition was muted. Economic 
considerations were not a major factor in the 2003 decision; however, easing economic 
tensions with the U.S. was a significant influence on Japan in maintaining unofficial 
cooperation on BMD during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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My data suggests that Japanese BMD foreign policy decision-making was rooted in 
realist thinking. Japan felt it was in a position in which its security was threatened, in 
particular by North Korea and China, and one means it sought to counter this threat was to 
cooperate with the U.S. BMD program. 
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Chapter V: The Case of Canada 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I identify and analyze the reasons why the government of Canada 
chose not to formally cooperate with the U.S.-led BMD program. Following the 
methodology outlined in Chapter III, Section 5.2 presents background and a chronology of 
BMD politics based on Canada's domestic and political issues and its international relations 
with the U.S. from 1983 to 2008. Section 5.3 focuses on the international level, and Section 
5.4 on the domestic level. Section 5.5 introduces James Fergusson's recent book, Canada 
and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1954-2009, which was published after the completion of my 
research. And Section 5.6 presents the answer to my central question: Why did Canada 
choose not to formally join in 2005? I conclude that my data of six external factors and one 
internal factor suggests that Canadian BMD foreign policy decisions were rooted in a 
combination of liberal internationalist and realist thinking. 
5.2 Chronology of Canadian-American BMD Relations 
Similar to the Japan case study, this section introduces a chronology divided into 
three periods. The first period, from 1983 to 1990, covers the time span during which Canada 
first became involved in BMD. The central feature of this period is the Canadian 
government's informal and conditional participation in the U.S. SDI. As with the chronology 
for Japan, Canada's first period ends with the end of the Cold War around 1990. The second 
period, from 1990 to 2005, covers the time span during which the Canadian government 
wavered as to whether or not to formally join the U.S. BMD program, and ends with 
Canada's decision in 2005 not to formally join. However, as will be discussed, Canada can 
be said to have informally joined. The third period, from 2005 to 2008, covers the time span 
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following this decision. Since 2005 there has been only low-level interaction between 
Canada and the U.S. on BMD. 
Period 1: NORAD and the Beginning of BMD Relations, 1983 to 1990 
Canada and the U.S. have long cooperated on matters of defense and security. In 
1958 the two countries signed an agreement establishing NORAD.182 NORAD is a bilateral 
defense organization whose mission is to protect North America from air and missile attacks. 
It remains an important element of the Canada-U.S. security and defense partnership, and is 
the organization through which Canada first became engaged in BMD. 
In the early 1980s, the U.S.S.R. not only intensified development its space technology 
for both defensive and offensive purposes but also continued development of long-range 
weapons such as bombers and cruise missiles.183 In response, in 1981, the U.S. and Canada 
agreed to increase their aerospace defense cooperation through NORAD, including exploring 
ABM defense systems. Soon after, the Reagan administration established SDI in 1983, in 
which NORAD was to play a key role.185 However, Canadian Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney declined formal involvement in SDI in 1985, although he was supportive of the 
new U.S. defense strategy.186 Instead, similar to Japan, the Canadian government allowed 
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private companies to become involved in SDI; thus, becoming informally involved. In 1986, 
Canada also renewed the NORAD agreement with the U.S.187 
The end of Period 1 is marked by the end of the Cold War around 1990. This 
dramatically changed the international security environment. The function of BMD systems, 
and their application to North American defense, subsequently underwent reevaluation. 
Period 2: Lukewarm BMD Relations, 1990 to 2005 
In 1993 Jean Chretien of the Liberal Party was elected Prime Minister and headed a 
majority government. In the view of the Chretien administration (1993-2003), the end of the 
Cold War dramatically reduced global military threats. Hence, maintaining high spending on 
defense no longer seemed justified. In addition, in the early 1990s, Canada experienced an 
economic recession. This combination of the end of the Cold War and a recession lessened 
Canada's motivation to be drawn into participation in a U.S. BMD system.1 9 However, as a 
counter balance, motivation for the government to maintain good relations with the U.S. 
(military and otherwise) increased after the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was concluded in 1993.190 At this time, the U.S. was urging Canada to contribute 
more to the budgets for NATO and NORAD.191 Hence, Canada experienced "dual pressures" 
relative to its involvement in the U.S. BMD program.192 It was experiencing pressure to 
participate and pressure to avoid participation, the later because of economic difficulties. 
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Canada-U.S. BMD relations did not actively progress during the 1990s. However, the 
two countries renewed their NORAD agreement in 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2000.193 Pressure 
on Canada to cooperate on BMD program intensified in 1999 when the Clinton 
administration's National Missile Defense Act was passed.194 In partial response to U.S. 
pressure, the Canadian government sent a delegation to visit U.S. missile defense 
laboratories.195 
BMD took on greater urgency for the U.S. after the attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. The U.S. more strongly emphasized the 
necessity of defending North America from outside attacks.196 In 2002, the Bush 
Administration announced that it would begin deployment of BMD systems in Alaska and 
California.197 Correspondingly, more pressure was put on Canada to participate. Domestic 
groups in Canada, such as military-related industries and the Canadian Aerospace 
Corporation, also urged the government to participate in the BMD program while public 
opposition began to increase around this time.198 Yielding to domestic industrial and U.S. 
pressure, the Canadian government began formal discussions with the U.S. government 
regarding participation. In 2003, Prime Minister Paul Martin stated that BMD was important 
for improving North American security and for improving Canada's bilateral relations with 
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the U.S.199 Under the Martin administration (2003-2006), the Canadian and American 
governments conducted frequent opinion exchanges on BMD issues. 
In January 2004, the Martin government asked the Bush administration to negotiate a 
"Missile Defense Framework Memorandum of Understanding" which would potentially 
formalize Canada's participation in the program.200 However, due to strong public 
disapproval of Bush's foreign policies, the Martin government could not get sufficient 
support to proceed with such negotiations. After this, instead of formally taking part in the 
program, in 2004 the Canadian and U.S. governments amended the NORAD agreement to 
add a new task, that of providing early warning data for the U.S. ground-based midcourse 
defense (GMD) system.201 
By this time, Canadian citizens had become more aware of BMD issues. NGOs such 
as the Canadian Campaign to Oppose Missile Defense (CCOMD) appeared in public. 
President Bush visited Canada in 2004 to discuss missile defense and border security, an 
event which stoked Canadians' anti-BMD feeling. By the end of 2004, it was clear that the 
Canadian public was strongly opposed to BMD.202 Despite a seeming consensus among the 
general public, clear political consensus still did not exist among political parties. The 
majority of the members in the federal Liberal Party and Conservative Party were 
apprehensive that the Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship would be negatively affected due to 
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the non-participation in the NMD program. Since Martin's government was a minority 
government (i.e., his Liberal Party did not command a majority of seats in Parliament), he 
felt pressures from multiple directions.204 Even though Martin himself was in favor of 
participation in the BMD program, he was not able to take a decisive leadership stance in 
favor of BMD. In addition, an upcoming federal election loomed. In the end, the Martin 
government failed to build political consensus, and on February 24, 2005, the Canadian 
government announced that it would not formally join the U.S. BMD program.205 
Period 3: Low-Level BMD Relations, 2005 to 2008 
An election was held in January 2006. It resulted in a minority government led by the 
Conservative Party with Stephen Harper becoming Prime Minister. In the lead-up to the 
election, the Conservative Party was purposefully vague on its stance on BMD, as was the 
Liberal Party.206 The other two main parties, the New Democratic Party (NDP) and Bloc 
Quebecois, strongly opposed participation in BMD. In February 2006, Stephen Harper 
took office. Subsequently, the 2005 decision was revisited, however it was not reversed. 
Then-Minister of Defence Gordon O'Connor stated that the Conservative government would 
potentially consider reopening missile defense negotiations with the U.S. if the U.S. 
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requested Canada to do so. However, the U.S. did not and has not requested this. Instead, 
the NORAD agreement was renewed in 2006.209 
Even though Prime Minister Harper seems to favour participation in the U.S. BMD 
program, he has been unable to garner sufficient support to push it through Parliament. 
Former opposition Liberal Party Leader Stephane Dion, for instance, criticized the Prime 
Minister for defending President Bush and the U.S. BMD program at a G-8 summit in 
2007.210 There was very little in the way of BMD-related activity for the remainder of the 
Bush administration. The situation has not changed since the election of Barak Obama. 
Summary 
Table 5.1 displays a chronology of Canada's involvement in the U.S.-led BMD 
program, highlighting Canada's process of equivocating on the BMD program from the mid-
1980s to the 2000s. 
Table 5.1 Chronology of Canada-U.S. BMD Relations211 
Year Event 
PERIOD 1 (1983-1990) 
1983 
1985 
1986 
U.S. President Reagan proposes SDI 
Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney declines government-based 
participation in SDI, but allows private companies to be involved 
NORAD renewed 
PERIOD 2 (1990-2005) 
1991 NORAD renewed 
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1993 Chretien of the Liberal Party becomes Prime Minister and heads a 
majority government. 
1996 NORAD renewed 
1999 Clinton administration signs the National Missile Defense Act to deploy 
a system as soon as technological feasible 
2000 NORAD renewed; Canadian delegation visits U.S. missile defense 
laboratories 
2001 The September 11 terrorist Attacks against the U.S. 
2002 Bush administration announces plan for initial deployment of BMD 
systems in Alaska and California 
2003 Canadian Aerospace Cooperation urges Prime Minister Chretien to join 
missile defense to win U.S. military contracts 
Canadian government begins formal discussion with the U.S. 
government regarding participation in the BMD program 
Martin becomes Prime Minister in a minority government and favors 
Canada joining U.S. BMD program 
2004 Canada and U.S. governments conduct opinion exchanges on BMD 
Canadian government asks U.S. to negotiate a "Missile Defense 
Framework Memorandum of Understanding, which would potentially 
formalize Canada's participation in the U.S. program 
Martin fails to get domestic political consensus over BMD policies 
among political parties 
NORAD renewed 
Canadian Campaign to Oppose Missile Defense established 
President Bush pressures Canada to join missile defense; visits Canada, 
stimulating anti-BMD feelings 
2005 On February 25, Prime Minister Martin declines Canada's formal 
participation in the U.S. BMD program 
PERIOD 3 (2005-2008) 
2006 Conservative Party wins federal election and establishes a minority 
government 
Conservatives mention possibility of reopening missile defense 
negotiation if the U.S. requests 
NORAD agreement renewed 
2007 Prime Minister Harper defends Bush on BMD program at G-8 summit 
2008 Barak Obama is elected U.S. President 
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5.3 Analysis of External Factors: International BMD Politics 
In this section, five external (international) factors influencing Canada's BMD 
decisions are identified and analyzed. These factors were chosen because they reflect the 
most common international factors stated in the sources I used. The factors are treated in 
more or less chronological order. There is overlap in some of the factors; however, each 
retains sufficient distinctness to be treated as a separate influence. 
Protecting Canada's Long-Held Liberal Internationalist Reputation 
Even though Canada maintained a close military relationship with the U.S., it was 
hesitant about participating in Reagan's SDI because it desired to protect its "internationalist" 
role and image. Since the end of the WWII, Canada had cultivated a liberal internationalist 
identity. In other words, Canada emphasized cooperation over conflict, strongly supported 
the UN, developed a deep commitment to international humanitarian law, and became 
heavily involved in UN PKOs. Michael Byers states in his book, Intent for a Nation, that 
"joining missile defense would also have run counter to Canada's long-held position as an 
advocate and architect of arms control agreements. [...] We would have been condoning the 
Bush administration's preference for military and technological rather than co-operative 
solutions to the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and terrorism."212 Thus, 
Canada perceived formal and open participation in the U.S. BMD program as running 
counter to its liberal internationalist identity. In the 1968 renewal of NORAD agreement, 
Canada inserted an ABM clause that stated that Canada would not violate the ABM clause.214 
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Canada especially wanted to avoid violating the ABMT and contributing to the 
weaponization of space. 
Protecting Canada's Freedom of Action in Foreign Affairs 
Besides protecting its liberal internationalist reputation, Canada also wanted to 
protect its freedom of action in foreign policy. Many policy makers and scholars saw 
Canada's participation in the U.S. BMD system as threatening its freedom of action, 
especially in terms of decision-making in foreign affairs, because Canada would not be an 
equal partner in BMD decisions; it would likely be forced to follow U.S. lead. Lloyd 
Axworthy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 2000, for instance, argued that if 
Canada participates in the U.S. BMD program, "the non-financial costs could be extreme: we 
[Canada] would lose our capacity to make independent choices . . . and find ourselves having 
to backtrack or renege on existing policies and treaties."215 Michael Byers states, "the 
February 2005 decision to stay out of missile defense was one of the most important foreign-
policy decisions that any Canadian government has ever made. At stake was nothing less 
than our freedom of action in international affairs, including our ability to play a constructive 
role in a global system based on co-operation and agreed rules rather than the threat and use 
of armed force."216 
Experiencing Dual Economic Pressures 
Economic pressures help explain Canada's "equivocal" position on BMD. Canada 
faced dual economic pressures. On the one hand, especially in the 1990s, it did not want to 
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spend money on military purposes, including an expensive BMD system, but on the other 
hand, it faced strong pressure from the U.S. not to free ride on U.S. military spending. 
In the early 1990s, Canada faced difficulty sustaining its military spending due to its 
domestic financial problems.217 Canada's problems were part of a larger recession 
experienced by much of the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The defining event of 
the recession was Black Monday of October 1987, during which the U.S. stock market lost 
over 20% of its value.218 This and the first Gulf War resulted in higher oil prices. Canada's 
domestic lumber industry, for example, suffered significant losses. 
At the same time that Canada was facing financial difficulties, the U.S. was urging 
Canada to contribute more to the military budgets for NATO and NORAD.219 Canada was 
expected to maintain its financial contributions to these security arrangements. However, the 
government was no longer able to justify to its citizens high defense expenditures because of 
the recession and the reduction in military threats with the end of the Cold War. 22° 
In summary, during the 1990s, Canada was dealing with dual economic pressures, 
domestic pressure to reduce its national debt (and hence military spending), and U.S. 
pressure to increase military spending. Due to these factors, Canada's motivation and 
217
 Ek, and Fergusson, "Congressional Research Service Report for Congress," 8. 
218
 David Glasner, and Thomas F. Cooley, ed. Business cycles and depressions: an encyclopedia, (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1997). 
219
 Ek, and Fergusson, "Congressional Research Service Report for Congress," 8. 
220
 Martin, "Budget in Brief," Department of Finance Canada (2001), 
http://www.fin.gc.ca^dget01^ief/brief-eng.asp (accessed July 21, 2010). 
221
 Ek, and Fergusson, "Congressional Research Service Report for Congress," 8. 
72 
decision-making regarding participation in the U.S. BMD program remained equivocal 
during this period. 
Using the NORAD Connection 
In North America, NORAD and BMD (especially NMD) are deeply related, first, 
because both share similar concepts of air defense, and second, because a NMD system could 
not function without NORAD.223 In particular, NORAD's early warning and tracking 
information would be included as an element of any NMD system.224 The NORAD-BMD 
connection proved a blessing and boon to Canada. Eventually NORAD served as a surrogate 
for formal participation in the U.S. BMD program.225 
NORAD was first agreed to in 1958. In the 1968 renewal of the NORAD agreement, 
Canada declared that it opposed engaging in an active missile defense program.226 Despite 
this, Canada recognized in the 1980s that it had to contribute to SDI; however, it chose 
informal participation by allowing Canadian companies to engage in BMD research and 
development. Thereafter, Canada consistently rejected U.S. overtures to formally participate, 
but also consistently agreed to NORAD renewals, which regularly occurred after Canada 
rejected U.S. requests for formal participation. Renewals were signed in 1986, 1991, 1996, 
2000, 2004 and 2006.227 
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The BMD-NORAD link is complex. In 2004, David Pratt, then-Minister of National 
Defense under the Martin government, stated that Canada had requested formal negotiation 
of a "Missile Defense Framework of Memorandum of Understanding" with the U.S.228 The 
two countries were to discuss Canada's participation in the U.S. BMD program and future 
expansion and enhancement of information exchange by emphasizing "NORAD as the 
centerpiece of participation." However, this was not an ideal situation because running a 
NMD system through NORAD could alter the nature of NORAD by expanding its (and 
hence, Canada's) mission beyond the North American continent. The reason for this is that 
the U.S. BMD program included not only NMD but also TMD components. In other words, 
it was oriented to not only defending North America through NMD but also U.S. foreign 
forces and allies through TMD systems. This bound the NMD and TMD systems together.230 
Thus, for Canada, a commitment to participate in NMD could easily lead to a global BMD 
commitment. Canada's status would change from solely a bilateral partner in NORAD to 
being a member country in a wider BMD program. 
As an example of the complexity of the BMD-NORAD link, in the 2004 renewal, 
which took place soon after the Martin government failed to formalize Canada's participation, 
Canada and the U.S. agreed to expand NORAD's role to provide early warning data to the 
U.S. GMD system.231 This renewal caused confusion among Canadian policy-makers and the 
public regarding whether or not Canada had officially joined part of the BMD program. 
Frank McKenna, then-Canadian ambassador to the U.S., announced that Canada had indeed 
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become part of the U.S. BMD program.232 However, the Martin government denied that the 
2004 NORAD amendment was a step toward joining the U.S. BMD program.233 
In 2006, under the newly elected Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, the Canadian and 
U.S. governments agreed to add maritime warning as a new NORAD function.234 Once again, 
this caused confusion. According to Emie Regehr, the agreement "certainly does not put to 
rest ongoing questions about North American security integration, including concerns about 
the gradual insinuation of Canada into the U.S. strategic ballistic missile system."235 
In practical and technical terms, it is hard to distinguish participation and non-
participation among NORAD, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and BMD 
because all three of these elements are intertwined.236 NORTHCOM was established in 
October 2002 after the September 11 attacks to consolidate and coordinate U.S. homeland 
defense. As Michel Chossudovsky cogently explains: "It [NORAD] has been integrated into 
U.S. Northern Command and Canada has become a de facto member of NORTHCOM under 
the auspices of an illusive transitional military body called the Bi-national Planning Group 
(BPG)."237 The BPG is an appendage of NORTHCOM in Colorado. Thus, NORTHCOM not 
only has an important role in BMD, but also, even though it is a unilateral U.S. organization, 
232
 David T. Jones, "When Politics Trumps Security: a Washington Vantage Point," Policy Options (2005): 46. 
233
 Fergusson, "Shall We Dance? The Missile Defense Decision, NORAD Renewal, and the Future of Canada-
US Defense Relations,"13-14. 
234
 Regehr, "NORAD Renewal: Further Done the Slippery Slope," 1. 
235
 Ibid. 
236
 Fergusson, "Shall We Dance? The Missile Defense Decision, NORAD Renewal, and the Future of Canada-
US Defense Relations," 16. 
237
 Michel Chossudovsky, "Canada and America: Missile Defense and the Vows of Military Integration," 
Centre for Research on Globalization (2005), 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:LxER9B-
lQ2gJ:www.globalresearch.ca/index.php%3Fcontext%3Dva%26aid%3D442+northcom+canada&cd=3&hl=en 
&ct=clnk&gl=ca (accessed July 18, 2010). 
75 
has more or less incorporated Canada as a de facto member. Thus, Canada's involvement 
in NORTHCOM could be interpreted as participation in the U.S. BMD system. 
In summary, Canada's connection with NORAD is an ambiguous factor that can be 
used to explain both why Canada did not join the U.S. BMD program and why Canada does 
not have to formally join to still be part of the program. The blurry lines among NORAD, 
NORTHCOM, and BMD systems both trapped Canada into participating in BMD but 
allowed Canada to participate without formally declaring its participation. 
Convinced by Missile Threats 
According to the Standing Committee on National Security and Defense, during the 
Cold War, Canada faced three types of missile threats: 
• "First, any nuclear exchange between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would likely send 
ICBMs over Canada, in both directions; 
• "Second, a U.S. anti-ballistic missile system would not wait for Soviet ICBMs to 
arrive in American airspace. The U.S. would seek to destroy them as soon after 
launch and as far away as possible, likely over the Canadian Arctic and maybe 
over more heavily populated areas further south; 
• "Third, if the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system was not 100% effective, Soviet 
ICBMs hitting northern American cities and military installations would also have 
a devastating effect on Canada."239 
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After the Cold War ended, the nature of missile threats changed. The types of threats 
described above were no longer as relevant. A major concern became the fate Soviet 
ICBMs.240 After the September 11 attacks, the possibility of an ICBM being launched by 
rogue states such as Iraq, Iran or North Korea increased.241 Canada felt less directly affected 
by these new missile threats. According to Steven Staples, after the end of the Cold War, 
"Canadians were never convinced that there was a missile threat to Canada."242 This lack of a 
perceived threat dampened Canada's enthusiasm for a U.S. NMD system. 
Support for U.S. Foreign Policy 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, Canada basically supported U.S. foreign policy 
related to BMD. Canada's BMD cooperation was informal during this period of time. 
However, Canada did renew NORAD agreements with the U.S. in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 
2004 and 2006. 
After the election of President George W. Bush in 2000, a major factor inhibiting 
Canada's willingness to formally join the U.S. BMD program was the new president's 
foreign policy, especially as it unfolded in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
Following 9/11, Canada cooperated with the U.S. on the war in Afghanistan, sending troops 
in October 2001.243 The 2003 invasion of Iraq, however, marked a major turning point in 
Canada's orientation to Bush's neo-conservative foreign policies.244 The so-called "war on 
terrorism" and its association with pre-emptive strike mentality on the part of the Bush 
administration made the Canadian government and public very wary. Canada became fearful 
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of being dragged into U.S. overseas military adventures, and Bush became increasingly 
unpopular among the Canadian public.245 
After his reelection in 2004, President Bush's first official visit was to Canada. BMD 
was one of the topics of discussion; however, Canada expected it to be a low profile issue. 
However, to the consternation of his hosts, Bush publicly declared, "I hope we'll also move 
forward on ballistic missile defense cooperation to protect the next generation of Canadians 
and Americans from the threats we know will arise."246 Prime Minister Martin later replied: 
"The answer is unequivocally no. We are against the militarization of space. We're against 
the weaponization of space, and we will not participate in it today nor will we tomorrow."247 
Opposition to BMD from Canadian activists and public became stronger. 
Canada increasingly feared both entrapment and abandonment by the Bush 
administration's foreign policies. It feared entrapment because it was afraid of being dragged 
into Bush's foreign military operations. It also feared abandonment because the U.S. was 
steadily developing its BMD systems without Canada's help.248 In addition, it feared 
abandonment because "any diminishment of the importance of NORAD to their American 
counterparts" left Canada isolated.249 The U.S., on the other hand, did not fear abandonment 
or entrapment in its alliance security relationships with Canada due to its preeminent military 
power and capabilities. Michael Byers states that "closer military cooperation between 
Canada and the U.S. is much more important to the Canadian Forces than to their American 
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counterparts." As Steven Staples notes, "the most valuable contribution we [Canada] could 
make [to the U.S. BMD program] was Canada's political endorsement of the system."251 If 
Canada joined, then "George W. Bush could show his critics at home and around the world 
that even Canada the peacekeeper, Canada the advocate of banning landmines, Canada the 
champion of nuclear disarmament, embraced his missile-defense system."252 
In summary, the Canada-U.S. military alliance exhibited in the early to mid-2000s a 
one-way alliance security dilemma for Canada, meaning, on the whole, Canada feared both 
abandonment and entrapment but the U.S. feared neither. It was a dilemma that many 
Canadians felt were the result of the Bush administration's actions, and they did not want to 
support for the actions. Publicly, both citizens and politicians reacted strongly against this 
entanglement. Thus, President Bush's personality and policies became a powerful reason 
why Canada decided not to join the U.S. BMD program in 2005. 
5.4 Analysis of Internal Factors: Domestic BMD Politics in Canada 
In this section, one internal factor influencing Canada's BMD decisions is identified 
and analyzed. 
Growing Public Opposition 
Growing public opposition to Canada's participation in the U.S. BMD program, 
particularly after 2000, was an important factor explaining why Canada did not join the 
program. The most important anti-BMD group to form was CCOMD which was established 
by the Polaris Institute and other citizen groups in March 2004.253 A related group, 
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Ceasefire.ca, was also created by the Polaris Institute and cooperated with CCOMD on the 
goal "to prevent Canada from joining the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence program."254 
Ceasefire.ca was a civil group applying web-based tools. CCOMD, in conjunction with 
Ceasefire.ca, conducted a broad campaign strategy, on the streets, in the backrooms of 
parliament, on TV shows, in newspapers, and through the Internet.255 They successfully 
influenced the Canadian government on BMD.256 
The key time period in terms of change of public opinion was between June and 
December of 2004 when the CCOMD and Ceasefire.ca campaigns were most active.257 
Steven Staples, one of the founders of both CCOMD and Ceasefire.ca, attributes the main 
reasons for their success as, first, CCOMD was conducted as "citizen-based" and second, the 
campaign was constructed based on "a set of fundamental Canadian values—co-operative 
and anti-militaristic values—that are shared by a great majority of Canadians in every part of 
the country."258 Indeed, reasons for the sway of public opinion to strong opposition echo the 
factors mentioned already—damage to Canada's long-held liberal internationalist identity, 
loss of freedom in foreign policy, and opposition to President Bush and his policies. In the 
end, even thought the Canadian government was generally favorably disposed to 
participation in BMD, it was not able to convince the Canadian people that Canada should 
join in the U.S. BMD program. 
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5.5 James Fergusson's Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1954-2009 
I had already finished my research and almost completed my thesis writing when 
James Fergusson's book, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1954-2009: Dejd vu All 
Over Again, was published in May 2010.259 Therefore, unfortunately, I was unable to include 
material from his book in my analysis. However, it is appropriate to briefly compare my 
conclusions with those that he sets forth in his book. 
Fergusson covers five decades of Canada's BMD relations with the U.S. His book is 
"a story about secondary states dealing with Great Powers."260 Hence, his book and my thesis 
both focus on relations between middle power and superpower nations relative to BMD 
politics. Fergusson's chronology is similar to mine; however, he traces the relationship 
starting at a much earlier date. He starts in the 1950s, and divides the span between 1954 and 
2005 into five periods based on major BMD technology developments or missile defense 
policy decisions, as follows: (1) anti-ballistic missiles from 1954 to 1971, (2) strategic 
defense initiatives from 1972 to 1985, (3) GPALS from 1986 to 1992, (4) National Missile 
Defense from 1993 to 2000, and (5) GMD from 2001 to 2005. My thesis chronology begins 
in 1983, and divides the span between 1983 and 2008 into three periods which basically 
correspond to Fergusson's third, fourth, and fifth periods. 
The overall orientation of my research and the content and purpose of Fergusson's 
book are different. I seek only to answer the question of why Canada did not join the U.S. 
BMD program. Fergusson, however, aims to present a complete history of Canada's BMD 
relations with the U.S., a history presented from a realist perspective. He repeatedly discusses 
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"lost opportunities" for Canada in not joining the U.S. He thinks BMD is necessary because 
eventually weaponization of outer space will occur and Canada must position itself for this 
new security environment where offensive and defensive strategic systems coexist. In the end, 
Fergusson supports formal participation in the U.S. BMD program. Factors he identifies as 
weakening Canada's will to join the program include Canadian governments' weak 
leadership, domestic conflicts between the Departments of External Affairs and National 
Defense, weak recognition of necessity of formal participation (because Canada believes that 
it will be protected by the U.S. without participation), and Canadian governments repeated 
failure to build its security strategic interests domestically and internationally through BMD. 
Compared to my research, Fergusson covers the technological aspects of BMD 
systems in much greater detail. We overlap, though, in our belief that both domestic and 
international politics are important. Relative to the factors that I identified as influential on 
Canada's BMD decision-making, they are more or less similar to arguments that Fergusson 
makes. Fergusson states "the process of expropriating US defense resources raises issues of 
Canada's sovereignty—the solution being to manage these through close cooperation with 
the United States, ensuring that Canadian sovereighty concerns are voiced and accounted for 
in the US planning process."26' This is similar to my factor of "protecting Canada's freedom 
of action in foreign policy." Regarding my factor: "support for U.S. foreign policy", 
Fergusson states that "Obama's popularity in Canada could pave the way for Canadian 
participation in terms of public support, in the same sense that pubic opposition to Bush 
' Ibid, 267. 
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made missile defense particpation untenable for the Martin government in 2004-05. "262 Thus, 
we both emphasize public opposition to the Bush administration as an important factor. 
Regarding my factor "protecting Canada's long-held internationalst reputation", 
Fergusson and I seem to differ. He argues that despite Canadian governments "trumpet[ing] 
Canadian internationalism," and "despite their self-image and rhetoric, Canadians remain 
more or less isolationist."263 In terms of BMD politics, I believe that Canada's position has a 
combination of liberal internationalist thinking and realist thinking as already explained. 
Fergusson does not focus on the relationship between economic issues and BMD 
politics; thus, he did not emphasize what I called my "experiencing dual financial pressures" 
factor. Another difference is our focus on alliance issues. Fergusson points out that "the 
AMB Treaty was Canada's safety blanket [which] provides an automatic ideal answer for 
Canadian governments wishing to avoid any potential problems stemming from US missile 
defense developments."264 He analyses Article 9 restrictions in the ABMT specifically 
focusing on their various interpretations among policy-makers. In my thesis, I completely 
missed this because it was not highlighted in the secondary sources that I used. Instead, I 
focused mainly on the NORAD connection. 
Fergusson concludes that "the story of Canada and ballistic missile defense is not 
only deja vu but also repeated lost opportunities."265 Canada could have joined the U.S. 
BMD programs in 1969, 1985, 1992, 2000 and 2005.266 He laments that Canada missed 
opportunities "to protect Canadian strategic interests," "to ensure a prominent role in North 
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American missile defense," and "to define the meaning of participation according to 
Canadian interests."267 Canadian strategic interests in this case means Canada gaining a 
greater influence in U.S. BMD decision-making process, greater access to BMD research and 
development, and testing, and greater roles in the U.S. BMD program. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this section, I summarize the seven factors that explain why Canada chose not to 
formally participate in the U.S.-led BMD program, and discuss their historical influence 
leading to Canada's 2005 decision to formally reject joining the program. 
First, Canada's desire to protect its long-held liberal internationalist reputation is a 
major factor explaining its decision. Since the end of WWII, Canada had constructed a 
liberal internationalist identity, especially as a long-standing supporter of the ABMT, 
opponent of the weaponization of space, and proponent of related arms control agreement. 
Canada recognized that participation in the U.S. BMD program would tarnish its liberal 
internationalist reputation and image. 
Second, Canada also wanted to protect its freedom of action in foreign affairs. 
Canada's participation in the U.S. BMD system would threat its freedom of action because it 
would not be an equal partner with the U.S. Canada was afraid that if Canada formally 
participated in the U.S. BMD program, it would have to follow U.S. foreign policy dictates. 
Third, the economic situation, especially in the 1990s, helps explain Canada's 
equivocal approach to BMD involvement. Canada was facing dual financial pressures during 
the 1990s. Due to the increasing national debt, Canada was under domestic pressure to reign 
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in spending. However, it also faced strong pressure from the U.S. to stop free riding on U.S. 
military spending. Due to these dual pressures, Canada's motivation and decision-making 
regarding participation in the U.S. BMD program remained ambiguous in the 1990s. 
Fourth, and similar to the above economic factor, the NORAD connection also helps 
explain Canada's equivocal approach to BMD; in particular, its formal rejection to join but 
its informal participation (through NORAD). Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, 
Canada consistently rejected U.S. requests to formally participate but also consistently 
agreed to NORAD renewals, which regularly occurred after Canada rejected U.S. requests 
for formal participation. 
Fifth, Canada's lack of perceived missile threats helps explain its hesitance to join the 
U.S. BMD program. After the change in the nature of missile threats in the post-Cold War 
era, Canada has remained unconvinced that it faced a significant threat. 
Sixth, Canada's negative reaction to President Bush's foreign policies is a major 
factor explaining its rejection of formal participation in the BMD program in 2005. Although 
Canada supported the U.S. on the war in Afghanistan, it opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
After this, Canada began to be worried about being snared in Bush's neo-conservative 
foreign policies. Bush became very unpopular in Canada. His growing unpopularity more or 
less paralleled opposition to BMD. 
Seventh and related to other factors, public opposition to BMD was also a major 
factor explaining Canada's choices. Opposition peaked in the mid-2000s. NGOs conducted 
successful campaigns to sway public opinion. Even though many politicians were privately 
sympathetic with BMD involvement, they could not ignore public opposition. 
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Table 5.2 lists the seven factors that I argue best explain why Canada chose not to 
cooperate with the U.S. BMD program, and classifies each factor's influence during each of 
three time periods, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Similar to Table 4.2,1 designated three levels of 
relative influence: weak (or none), medium, and strong. My assessment of the level of 
influence is subjective. It is based on my own judgment and on the strength and frequency of 
statements by various scholars and commentators as to the importance of each factor during 
the time periods. 
Table 5.2 Factors Explaining Canada's Decisions to Reject Formal Participation in the 
U.S. BMD Program, and their Historical Influence 
Factors 1980s 1990s 2000s 
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
Protecting Canada's Long-Held 
Internationalists Reputation 
Protecting Canada's Freedom of 
Action in Foreign Affairs 
Experiencing Dual Financial 
Pressures 
Using the NORAD Connection 
Convinced by Missile Threats 
Support for U.S. Foreign Policy 
Weak 
Weak 
Medium 
Strong 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Strong 
Strong 
Weak 
Medium 
Strong 
Strong 
Weak 
Strong 
Weak 
Weak 
DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Growing Public Opposition Weak Weak Strong 
I am now in a position to answer another of my research questions: Why did Canada 
decide not to formally join the U.S.-led BMD program in 2005? Canada decided not to 
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formalize its participation in the program because of (1) the risk that joining posed to its 
liberal internationalist reputation and its freedom of action in world affairs, (2) the lack of a 
perceived missile threat to its territory, (3) the intense unpopularity of President Bush in 
Canada, and (4) strong public opposition. Economic considerations were not a major factor 
in the 2005 decision; however, like Japan, easing economic tensions with the U.S. were a 
significant influence in maintaining unofficial cooperation on BMD during the 1980s and 
1990s. Despite not formally joining the program, Canada's position on BMD was, and still is, 
equivocal. This is best illustrated in the "using the NORAD connection" factor. Even though 
Canada rejected formal BMD cooperation, it informally cooperated through NORAD and 
later also through NORTHCOM. Thus, it is perhaps fair to say that Canada joined but did not 
join. 
My data suggests that Canadian BMD foreign policy decision-making was rooted in a 
combination of liberal internationalist and realist thinking. Canada did not believe that it 
faced an urgent missile threat following the end of the Cold War, however it recognized that 
new types of missile threats existed and that these may become more important in the future. 
Therefore it believed that maintaining quiet and unofficial connections with the U.S. BMD 
program through the NORAD was the best course of action. This allowed Canada to 
emphasize its well-established liberal internationalist credentials, those highlighting 
cooperation over conflict in the international system. 
87 
Chapter VI: Comparative Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I compare and analyze my two case studies. Following the 
organization of the previous Chapters IV and V, Japan's and Canada's chronologies of BMD 
relations with the U.S. from 1983 to 2008 are first compared (Section 6.2), then, after an 
introductory section on how I set up the comparative analysis in terms of eight generic 
categories (Section 6.3), the external factors (Section 6.4) and internal factors (Section 6.5) 
affecting their decisions are compared. The answers to my research questions are 
summarized in the concluding Section 6.6. 
6.2 Comparing the Histories - Japan's and Canada's BMD Relations with the U.S. 
This section compares the history of Japan's and Canada's bilateral BMD relations 
with the U.S. from 1983 to 2008. It is divided into three periods. Period 1 (1983 to 1990) is 
the same for both countries, and describes the beginning of both countries' involvement in 
BMD. Period 2 is a time of ambiguous relations with the U.S. for both countries. In the case 
of Japan, it extends from 1990 to 2003. Japan exhibited tentative but increasing involvement 
in the U.S. BMD program, culminating in its decision to formally participate in 2003. In the 
case of Canada, the second period extends from 1990 to 2005. Canada exhibited a lukewarm 
BMD relationship with the U.S. Although Canada seemed like it might join in the early 
2000s, in the end it decided not to formally join the BMD program. During period 3 the 
country's paths are divergent. In the case of Japan, by 2008 it began deployment of a BMD 
system. In the case of Canada, after 2005 only low-level BMD relations with the U.S. were 
maintained. 
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Period 1: Beginning o/BMD Relations (1983-1990) 
During Period 1, Japan and Canada both became involved in BMD. Both were 
primarily drawn into it through SDI established by Reagan in 1983. Canada, however, 
already had a long history of aerospace defense cooperation with the U.S., dating from 1958 
through NORAD. The 1981 renewal of the NORAD agreement included exploration of 
ABM defense systems. Despite this long history, Canada, as with Japan, hesitated to formally 
participate in SDI. Both countries were mainly worried about violating the ABMT and 
concerned about domestic public opposition. Instead of joining, they encouraged private 
companies to be involved in SDI. By the middle 1980s, the two governments had begun to 
display differences in their approach toward the U.S. In 1985, Canadian Prime Minister 
Mulroney formally declined government-based participation in SDI, but did agree to renew 
the NORAD agreement in 1986. However, the Japanese government decided to conditionally 
participate within the SDI framework in 1986. Japanese private companies, for instance, 
began joint research with the U.S. government (e.g., WESTPAC). Canada remained outside 
the framework but connected through NORAD. 
In summary, in Period 1, both the Japanese and Canadian governments were hesitant 
to formally participate in SDI on a government-to-government basis with the U.S. for similar 
reasons. However, by the end of the 1980s, Japan was involved within the SDI framework 
while Canada remained outside it. 
Period 2: Reaching Different Decisions (Japan: 1990-2003; Canada: 1990-2005) 
In Period 2, Japan and Canada took markedly different paths in their BMD relations 
with the U.S. and reached different decisions. Both countries were pressured by the U.S. to 
contribute more to general military spending. The U.S. considered both countries to be free 
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riding. The U.S. criticized Japan, for instance, for not sending troops during the Gulf War, 
and criticized Canada, for instance, for not contributing enough to the military budgets of 
NATO and NORAD. Despite this pressure, both Japan and Canada still resisted formal 
participation in BMD during the early 1990s. 
North Korean missile tests in 1993 and 1998 began to fundamentally alter Japan's 
perception of missile threats. Japan decided to engage in government-based research and 
development with the U.S. Examples include the 1994 U.S.-Japan Bilateral Study on BMD, 
the 1995 Synthetic Examination Research regarding Japan's Air Defense System, the 1998 
Joint Research on Japan-U.S. BMD, and the 1998 Japan-U.S. Joint Technology Research 
related to BMD. The Bush administration's announcement in 2002 that the U.S. would begin 
deployment of missile defense systems was a turning point for Japan. Soon after the 
announcement, the Japanese government approved the "Introduction of a BMD System and 
Other Measures" in 2003, and Prime Minister Koizumi took the initiative to formalize 
participation in the U.S. BMD program. Compared to Canada, government officials in Japan 
agreed on the necessity of a missile defense system to protect their country. 
In contrast, Canada did not engage in government-based research and development 
with the U.S. Instead, Canada maintained its link to BMD through renewals of the NORAD 
agreement in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2006. Discussions to formally join took 
place in 2003. The Martin administration sought a Memorandum of Understanding on BMD. 
However, this failed and in 2005 the Canadian government announced that it would not 
formally participate in the program. 
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In summary, during Period 2, Japan progressed step by step in its BMD commitment 
to the U.S., and decided its formal participation in 2003. Canada, however, wavered 
throughout the 1990s, failed to build domestic political consensus in the early 2000s, and 
abandoned the effort in 2005. Instead of formal participation, Canada maintained indirect 
involvement in the U.S. BMD program through NORAD. 
Period 3: Aftermath of the Decisions (to 2008) 
After their respective decisions, both Japan and Canada continued their bilateral 
BMD relations with the U.S.; however, Japan became only the second country in the world 
after Israel to actually deploy a BMD system. After the formal approval in 2003, Japan 
earnestly addressed its domestic legal and constitutional issues related to BMD; for instance, 
reinterpreting self-restrictions in its "exclusively defense oriented policy," its "Three 
Principles on Arms Export," and its "Basic Space Law." In 2006, Japan deployed an X-Band 
Radar system in Aoyama Prefecture and a PAC-3 unit in Okinawa Prefecture. In 2007, Japan 
installed another PAC-3 unit in Saitama Prefecture. In 2008, the Aegis-equipped destroyer, 
Kongo, was deployed in Nagasaki Prefecture. 
In Canada, the Conservative Party won federal election in 2006 and became a 
minority government. The Conservative government hinted that it may reopen negotiations 
on BMD participation with the U.S., but when this met with opposition, the government 
instead, and once again, renewed the NORAD agreement, in 2007. Thus, Canada's approach 
during Period 3 was basically a continuation of that of Period 2. 
In summary, during Period 3 Japan's commitment to BMD has deepened 
significantly; whereas, Canada's orientation did not change. 
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6.3 Comparing the Factors 
In Chapters 4 and 5,1 identified a set of external (international) and internal 
(domestic) factors that affected Japan's and Canada's BMD relations with the U.S., and the 
respective influence of these factors in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. This information was 
summarized in Tables 4.2 and 5.2. The data sets from these tables have been combined in 
Table 6.1 below. In addition, I have created a set of eight generic categories of factors in 
Table 6.1 that covers all the types of factors that were independently derived for both Japan 
and Canada. These generic categories are: 
International factors: 
1. economic and financial issues 
2. military capabilities 
3. missile threat perceptions 
4. alliance issues 
5. protecting national image 
6. protecting sovereignty 
Domestic factors: 
7. public opinion 
8. government's legal and political adaptability. 
In Section 6.4,1 compare the six international factors, and in Section 6.5,1 compare 
the two domestic factors. While it is instructive to compare these two countries' international 
and domestic factors relative to the eight generic categories representing most common 
international and domestic factors, the specific factors within each generic category are in 
many cases different. This reflects their different economic and financial contexts, military 
structures and roles, and their security circumstances. In addition, even though they both 
have alliance issues with the U.S., these differ. 
92 
Table 6.1 Comparative Factors Explaining Japan's and Canada's Decisions in BMD 
General 
Category 
Country Factor 1980s 1990s 2000s 
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
Economic and 
Financial Issues 
Japan 
Canada 
Easing Economic 
Frictions 
Experiencing Dual 
Financial Pressures 
Strong 
Medium 
Medium 
Strong 
Weak 
Weak 
Military 
Capabilities 
Japan 
Canada 
Serving to Develop 
Japan's Military 
Capability 
Weak Medium Strong 
Missile Threat 
Perceptions 
Japan 
Canada 
Responding to 
Missile Threats 
Convinced by 
Missile Threats 
Weak 
Medium 
Strong 
Weak 
Strong 
Weak 
Alliance Issues Japan 
Canada 
Resolving Alliance 
Dilemmas 
Support for U.S. 
Foreign Policy 
Using the NORAD 
Connection 
Medium 
Medium 
Strong 
Strong 
Medium 
Strong 
Strong 
Weak 
Strong 
Protecting 
National Image 
Japan 
Canada 
— 
Protecting Canada's 
Long-Held Liberal 
Internationalist 
Reputation 
— 
Weak 
— 
Medium 
— 
Strong 
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Protecting 
Sovereignty 
Japan 
Canada Protecting Canada's 
Freedom of Action 
in Foreign Affairs 
— 
Weak 
— 
Medium 
— 
Strong 
DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Public Opinion Japan 
Canada 
Smoothing Japanese 
Public Reactions to 
BMD 
Growing Public 
Opposition 
Weak 
Weak 
Weak 
Weak 
Strong 
Strong 
Government's 
Legal and 
Political 
Adaptability 
Japan 
Canada 
Circumventing 
Constitutional 
Obstacles 
None Weak Strong 
6.4 Comparative Analysis of External (International) Factors 
In this section, the six categories of international factors which influenced Japan and 
Canada's BMD decisions are compared and analyzed. The factors are treated in more or less 
chronological order. There is overlap in some of the factors; however, each retains sufficient 
distinctness to be treated as a separate influence. 
Economic and Financial Issues 
During the 1980s to 1990s, economic and financial issues were influential factors for 
both Japan and Canada in terms of their decision-making process related to U.S. missile 
defense policy. During the 1980s, the U.S. was facing serious trade deficits with Japan, 
which caused serious bilateral tensions. As one way to alleviate the deficit problem, the U.S. 
pressured Japan to contribute more to military expenditures, including participating in 
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funding for missile defense systems. The Japanese government relented to a degree and 
allowed Japanese companies to participate in SDL Even after the bubble burst on the 
Japanese economy in the early 1990s, cooperation on missile defense as a means of 
moderating U.S. criticism of Japan as a free-rider on U.S. military spending continued during 
the 1990s. By the 2000s, when Japan finally decided to formally join the U.S. BMD program, 
economic issues were no longer a major factor influencing Japan's BMD relations with the 
U.S. 
As with Japan, Canada was also under pressure from the U.S. regarding contributions 
to military expenses during the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1980s, though, Canada did not have a 
trade deficit issue with the U.S., so escaped the economic pressure that Japan received 
relative to joining SDL In the 1990s, both Japan and Canada were facing serious domestic 
economic issues. In Japan, the economic bubble had burst, and in Canada, the government 
had to deal with a major recession. However, when pressured by the U.S. not to be a free 
rider on U.S. military spending, the Canadian government showed greater reluctance to 
increase military spending than Japan. 
In summary, by the 2000s, economic issues were no longer a major factor for either 
Japan or Canada vis-a-vis the U.S. 
Military Capabilities 
Both Japan and Canada have recognized that BMD cooperation with the U.S. can 
enhance their military capabilities. For Japan, BMD is a vehicle to introduce advanced U.S. 
military technologies to Japan. This has become an increasing strong factor from the 1980s to 
2000s. In the 1980s, it was a weak consideration, became stronger in the 1990s as Japan 
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increasingly recognized outside security and missile threats, especially from North Korea, 
and has become even stronger in the 2000s when China has risen as a military challenger in 
Asia. In addition to technology, BMD involvement with the U.S. has forced Japan to 
reorganize and better integrate its SDFs. Thus, introduction of advanced U.S. BMD 
technology and reorganization/integration of SDFs for BMD operations has contributed to 
enhancing Japan's overall military capabilities, and, hence, has been an increasingly 
important factor in BMD decisions over the past three decades. 
Enhancing military capabilities has been less of an overt factor for Canada. Indeed, 
advanced U.S. military technologies have been introduced to Canada, but not active BMD 
systems such as PAC units and the Aegis destroyer. BMD-related technologies in Canada 
seem to have been introduced through its NORAD cooperation with the U.S. 
In summary, the influence of the military capabilities factor has been very different 
for Japan and Canada. For Japan, enhancing its military capabilities has become an 
increasingly important factor over the past three decades. However, for Canada, building its 
military capabilities through BMD participation has not been a driving force in Canada's 
decision-making. 
Missile Threat Perceptions 
Perceptions of missile threats are a major factor explaining the different decisions by 
Japan and Canada regarding BMD. In the 1980s, during the Cold War, both countries 
perceived missile threats relative to a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
However, after the Cold War ended, the perception changed significantly for Japan and 
Canada. 
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Japan feels increasingly threatened due to North Korea's tests conducted in 1993, 
1998, and 2006. In the 2000s, China has been rapidly developing and modernizing its 
military and nuclear missile capabilities. Thus, BMD is seen as an increasingly significant 
means to defend itself, despite protests from China and North Korea. Canada, in the post-
Cold War era, no longer perceives an acute missile threat. The U.S. has shifted its principle 
focus to rogue states, but for Canada, those rogue states are not direct or urgent security 
threats. 
In summary, by the 2000s Japan and Canada had very different missile threat 
perceptions due to their differing geopolitical situations. For Japan, missile threats have been 
an increasingly important factor in its BMD decision-making, and for Canada, they have 
become increasingly less pertinent. 
Alliance Issues 
Resolving alliance issues has been an influential and complex factor for both Japan 
and Canada relative to their BMD decision-making throughout the entire period of study. 
Alliance issues between Japan-U.S. and Canada-U.S. demonstrate clear differences that help 
explain why Japan and Canada took different path relative to joining the U.S. BMD program. 
The bilateral alliance relationship between Japan and the U.S. displays typical 
alliance security dilemmas; in other words, competing tensions of abandonment and 
entrapment by both parties. Japan is geopolitically important to the U.S.; it is a "power 
projection platform" functioning as a forefront-deployment base for the U.S. in Northeast 
Asia. And the U.S. is important to Japan because Japan is highly dependent on the U.S. for 
maintaining its security and defense. Japan's partial cooperation in SDI during the 1980s was 
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intended, for instance, to be a symbol of solidarity as a responsible ally. In the 1990s, Japan 
and the U.S. began to feel fear of abandonment in their alliance relation, and a goal became 
to reaffirm and strengthen their security relationship. BMD became an element of this. In the 
2000s, Japan began to fear entrapment; in part, entrapment by Bush's foreign policy actions. 
However, this did not slow Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation. 
The bilateral alliance relationship between Canada and the U.S. displays primarily a 
one-way alliance security dilemma; only Canada fears abandonment and entrapment by the 
U.S. During the 1980s, Canada did not experience any unusual alliance issues with the U.S. 
In the 1990s, issues arose relative to the relationship between BMD and NORAD. As it 
evolved under the Clinton administration, the U.S BMD program became oriented to 
defending North America through NMD and defending U.S. foreign forces and allies through 
TMD systems. After passage of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act, U.S. pressure on 
Canada to cooperate on BMD program was increased. For Canada, a commitment to 
participate in NMD could easily lead to a global BMD commitment from a bilateral 
commitment through NORAD. To avoid this, Canada chose to continually "hide" its formal 
BMD involvement under NORAD. Canada could then reject direct and formal commitment 
to BMD, but still participate through NORAD. Hence, Canada became "informally" involved. 
After the election of George W. Bush in 2000, the alliance security dilemmas facing 
Canada changed. It experienced both fears of abandonment and entrapment. Canada feared 
abandonment because the U.S was cooperating with other countries and developing BMD 
systems without Canada's support. Canada was afraid of losing its influence with the U.S. 
Canada also feared entrapment by Bush's military policies. In part because of this fear of 
entrapment, eventually the majority of Canadian people came to strongly dislike the Bush 
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administration. Negative reaction to President Bush and his foreign military adventures and 
neo-conservative foreign policies became a major factor inhibiting Canada's willingness to 
formally participate in the U.S. BMD program. 
Canada's decision not to formally join the U.S. BMD program in 2005, though, was 
not a major blow to the U.S. because the U.S. has been able to go ahead with BMD 
deployment on the North American continent without Canada. In addition, Canada is a de 
facto partner through NORAD. In this point, the U.S. does not fear abandonment by Canada 
even though it was rejected by Canada to formally participate in the U.S. BMD program in 
2005. James Fergusson argues that Canada repeatedly lost opportunities to formalize its 
BMD involvement and to build Canada's strategic interests. However, my data suggest that 
opportunities have not really been lost; they have merely been displaced when Canada had 
several opportunities to formally join the U.S. BMD program in 1969, 1985, 1992, 2000, and 
2005. 
In summary, the bilateral relation between Japan and the U.S. demonstrates that the 
two countries' mutual alliance dilemmas, alliance goals, and expectations were clear to each 
other, and were in accord with each other. However, the bilateral relation between Canada 
and the U.S. demonstrates Canada's one-way alliance security dilemma. Due to unpopularity 
of Bush's foreign policies, Canada's fear of being entrapped by U.S. military policies 
increased more than fear of abandonment especially among the public; eventually, decided to 
reject Bush's offer to participate in the program, instead of trying to resolve its one-way 
alliance security dilemmas. These differences between Japan and Canada affected U.S. 
expectations toward the two countries. 
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Protecting National Image 
A conspicuous difference between Japan and Canada is found in their attitude and 
effort to try to protect national images in international society. Despite its close military 
relationship with the U.S. through NORAD, Canada was hesitant about participating in SDI 
because it desired to protect its long-held liberal internationalist image and reputation, which 
influenced Canada's decision-making process over participation in the U.S. BMD program. 
Canada and the Canadians are proud of themselves as supporters of the UN including heavy 
involvement in UN PKOs, their commitment to international humanitarian law, their support 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, ABMT and related arms control agreements. 
Canada perceived formal participation in the U.S. BMD program as spoiling its liberal 
internationalist identity; instead, Canada chose to protect its liberal internationalist image 
without conducing formal participation in the U.S. BMD program. 
Despite Japan's Peace Constitution and strong self-regulation regarding defense 
issues, the Japanese government has been consistently supportive about BMD since the 
1980s. None of the cabinets since the Nakasone administration strongly or clearly opposed 
the U.S. BMD program or stated that Japan's participation may damage Japan's national 
image in international society. Despite China and the D.P.R.K.'s opposition to its BMD 
cooperation with the U.S., Japan still continued research and development, eventually 
formally approved its participation in the U.S. BMD program and deployment of TMD 
systems. 
In summary, Canada's effort to protect its national image and reputation as a liberal 
internationalist nation-state influenced its decision-making process over participation in the 
U.S. BMD program. On the other hand, protecting its national image and reputation has not 
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been a significant element of Japan's decision-making. Instead, Japan has prioritized 
responding to U.S. expectations for reasons based in realism. 
Protecting Sovereignty 
Japan and Canada perceived sovereignty issues relative to BMD differently. In 
Canada, many policy-makers such as Lloyd Axworthy and scholars such as Michael Byers 
saw Canada's formal participation in the U.S. BMD system as damaging its freedom of 
action because Canada would not be an equal partner in BMD decisions. To protect its 
freedom of decision-making in foreign policy, they insisted that Canada should not formally 
participate in the U.S. BMD program; their insistence became stronger especially in the 
2000s. Japan, however, has never had such concern. The majority of policy-makers and 
scholars tend to agree that Japan's participation in the U.S. BMD program is necessary for 
Japan and Japan-U.S. alliance relationships. 
The differences in perception of threats to national sovereignty can be in part 
attributed to differing geopolitical and military relations with the U.S. Canada has 
traditionally tried to delicately balance its position: promoting a close relationship with the 
U.S. while at the same time maintaining its own independence and sovereignty. Canada's 
close proximity to the U.S. means that the BMD systems it must cooperate on are the broader 
scale national missile defense systems. Japan instead does not have such a fear due to decent 
geopolitical distance from the U.S. Japan's BMD system. Japan's BMD systems are theater 
missile defense; hence, Japan did not need to be worried about losing its freedom of decision-
making abilities due to formal participation in the U.S. BMD program and introduction of 
TMD systems. These differences of BMD postures would give fundamentally different 
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impressions toward the two states on the process of estimating their own national interests 
and political risks. 
In summary, Japan and Canada had significantly different perceptions regarding the 
'stickiness' of participation in the U.S. BMD program. In Japan, TMD systems were not 
perceived to disturb its own freedom of action in foreign policies. However, in Canada, 
formal participation in the U.S. BMD program and deployment of NMD systems were 
perceived to damage its freedom of action in foreign policy. 
6.5 Comparative Analysis of Internal (Domestic) Factors 
In this section, the two categories of domestic factors which influenced Japan's and 
Canada's BMD decisions are compared and analyzed. 
Public Reaction 
The differing of public reactions in Japan and Canada was an influential factor 
explaining why the two countries made different decisions. Following the D.P.R.K. missile 
tests in 1998, the Japanese public began to be interested in BMD issues. From this time , 
public support for missile defense systems gradually began to build, especially after 2001. A 
combination of the September 11 terrorist attacks and strong support for BMD by the well-
liked Prime Minister Koizumi, increased the Japanese public's acceptance of BMD. Thus, 
there was no strong opposition against participation in the U.S. BMD program and 
deployment of missile defense systems in Japan. Due to passive reactions of the Japanese 
public, it was relatively easy for the Japanese government to advance its BMD cooperation 
with the U.S. 
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The situation was totally different in Canada. Public opposition to Canada's 
participation in the U.S. BMD program grew especially strong in the mid-2000s. A 
combination of perceived damage to Canada's long-held liberal internationalist identity, loss 
of freedom in foreign policy, and opposition to President Bush and his policies helped sway 
the Canadian public. The Canadian government failed to convince the people that Canada 
should join in the U.S. BMD program. 
In summary, the Japanese public and Canadian public reacted to their governments 
very differently. The Japanese public was informed but inactive on BMD issues in general; 
hence, the government did not need to spend a lot of effort convincing its people. However, 
the Canadian public was more informed than the Japanese public and was more active, for 
instance in civil campaigns. Therefore, the Canadian government needed to convince the 
public of the value of participation in the U.S. BMD program, but it could not do so. The 
government's failure to convince the public eventually became one of the most influential 
factors in its eventual decision not to join the program. 
Government's Legal and Political Adaptability 
Unlike the case of Canada, Japan has legal and constitutional compatibility issues 
relative to BMD. These domestic issues could have been a fatal factor for the Japanese 
government inhibiting it from joining the U.S. BMD program. However, despite these 
incompatibilities, Japan did join without altering its constitution. Instead, the Japanese 
government undertook a modest amendment approach. Japan's modest amendment approach 
began to appear around the 1990s but was especially active after formal participation in 2003. 
In summary, even though Japan faced legal and constitutional incompatibilities with the 
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BMD concept, it succeeded in circumventing them. Canada did not have to deal with this 
type of situation at all. 
6.6 Conclusion 
As can be readily seen in the Table 6.1, a variety of factors influenced Japan's and 
Canada's BMD decision-making, and not all factors carried equal weight during each time 
period. 
During the 1980s, Japan's main reasons for sustaining interest in BMD were to ease 
trade friction with the U.S. and to resolve alliance issues, especially military free riding 
criticism by the U.S. Canada's main reasons for sustaining interest in BMD were similar, 
especially to maintain a positive alliance relation with the U.S. The NORAD connection was 
a primary venue for addressing BMD issues. 
During the 1990s, both countries had a qualified relationship with the U.S. on BMD. 
They neither strongly endorsed it nor outright rejected it. For both countries, the economic 
and alliance factors remained influential. Where we begin to see divergence between Japan 
and Canada is over their perceptions of international security and domestic military 
capability issues. Japan began to see opportunities to enhance its military capabilities by 
cooperating with the U.S. BMD program. The desire to strengthen military capabilities was 
boosted by recognition of increasing security threats in Northeast Asia, especially after the 
1998 North Korean missile tests. Canada, on the other hand, perceived a decrease in military 
threats after the collapse of the Soviet Union. BMD relations continued to be manifested 
through NORAD, though. However, due to economic difficulties, Canada was not willing to 
commit more resources by joining the BMD program. In addition, it gradually began to feel 
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greater concern over spoiling its image as a liberal internationalist country and compromising 
its sovereignty if it joined the program. Thus, we can see that even though outwardly the two 
countries maintained similar stances regarding involvement with the U.S. BMD program, 
inwardly they were moving in different directions. I argue that the primary reason explaining 
this is the differing degree to which Japan and Canada perceived security threats in the post-
Cold War world; they increased for Japan but decreased for Canada. 
By the 2000s, Japan and Canada had reached opposition conclusions regarding 
joining the U.S. BMD program. Japan joined; Canada did not. For Japan, addressing security 
threats (which now included a rising China), boosting its military capabilities, and 
strengthening the alliance with the U.S. were the dominant factors resulting in its 2003 
decision. Significantly, the factors of addressing constitutional obstacles and managing 
public opposition were essential in that they made Japan's decision relatively uncontroversial. 
A major factor of the 1980s and 1990s—easing economic friction—had became much less 
important. 
For Canada, a series of factors lay behind the 2005 decision not to join, including the 
lack of perceived security threats, desire to protect its liberal internationalist image and 
freedom of action, and strong public opposition to President Bush. However, Canada, like 
Japan, wished to maintain a good alliance relationship with the U.S. In this, the NORAD was 
a complex but critical factor, and was a factor that was strong for the entire time period of 
study. NORAD not only pulled Canada into the BMD program but also allowed Canada to 
officially reject joining but still work with the U.S. on various aspects of BMD. 
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In conclusion, relative to Japan's and Canada's middle power relations with the U.S. 
on BMD, I argue that, in simple terms, realist (i.e., security and power-based) reasons explain 
why Japan joined, and liberal (i.e., internationalist) reasons explain why Canada did not join. 
In BMD politics, the comparison of each set of the factors in Japan's and Canada's decision-
making process reveals that the principles underlying the two countries' BMD foreign policy 
decision-making were fundamentally different. Japanese foreign policy decision-making was 
rooted in realist thinking, and Canadian foreign policy decision-making was rooted in a 
combination of liberal internationalist and realist thinking. This difference goes a long way 
toward explaining why Japan joined the U.S.-led BMD program and Canada did not. 
Canada's BMD politics and negotiation with the U.S. over the three periods have been more 
complicated than the case of Japan's because, even though Canada has a realist-rooted idea 
in its national defense, it also has the strong liberal internationalist thinking and pride in its 
foreign policy. Japan was more dominated by a realist mindset in terms of BMD politics; 
hence, even though Japan is a pacifist nation-state, its motivation and context allowed Japan 
to be formally part of the U.S. BMD program without significant domestic opposition. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The results of my comparative analysis in Chapter VI demonstrate the complexity of 
BMD relations with the U.S for the middle power countries, Japan and Canada. Japan 
established a positive and. formal working relationship with the U.S., and Canada established 
a positive and informal working relationship with the U.S. (choosing to cooperate through 
NORAD). Both countries have maintained their BMD relationship, despite ups and downs, 
since 1983 when Reagan announced the SDL In this final chapter, I review of my research, 
discuss its limitations, make suggestions for future research, and briefly look at changes in 
BMD politics since the election of President Obama. 
7.2 Contribution to the Study of BMD Issues 
My research provides perspectives on BMD politics through a comparative case study. 
As stated at the beginning of the thesis, to my knowledge, there are no similar studies. I 
developed a methodology based on analysis of international and domestic factors that can be 
used for other case studies. Also, through application of this method to Japan and Canada, I 
derived a set of eight factors that can be used as a starting point for other case studies. These 
factors are (see Section 6.3): 
International factors: 
1. economic and financial issues 
2. military capabilities 
3. missile threat perceptions 
4. alliance issues 
5. protecting national image 
6. protecting sovereignty 
Domestic factors: 
7. public opinion 
8. government's legal and political adaptability. 
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It is my hope that my research can contribute to future research on BMD. In particular, 
the framework of factors that was developed in this thesis can be used by other scholars as a 
starting point for comparisons of BMD politics between the U.S. and other powers. Other 
cases could be conducted to see if the generic or specific factors that I identified in this study 
are applicable. 
My results provide a deeper understanding of U.S., Japanese, and Canadian BMD 
politics. By tracing the histories of Japan's and Canada's relationship with the U.S. from the 
1980s to 2008,1 was able to show how these various factors changed and interacted over this 
30-year period, and to show that these countries' decisions to join or not to join the U.S. 
BMD program derived from this long history; they did not spring from factors that existed 
solely at the time of the decisions. 
In summary, I have created a methodology for analyzing BMD bilateral relations, 
derived a set of eight generic factors applicable to such relations, and demonstrated the 
historical depth required to analyze these relations. All of these aspects of my work can be 
used by other scholars to apply to other case studies. Further case studies would serve to 
illuminate the degree to which realist and international liberal factors explain other countries' 
BMD relations with the U.S. 
7.3 Limitations of My Research 
There are several limitations to my research. First, there may be biases in the 
selection of factors. I chose the eight general categories based on other scholars' 
interpretations and my own detailed reading and understanding of the BMD literature. I tried 
to strike a balance between not too few and not too many factors. Initially, I had a list of 
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about 25 different factors, but this seemed too cumbersome for analysis. Thus, other scholars 
could come to different conclusions as to selection and labeling of the categories. Application 
of my methodology to other country case studies will help determine how universal the 
generic factors identified in this thesis are. 
A second, and similar, limitation is possible biases or inaccuracies in evaluating the 
historical changes in the influence of the factors. The level of influence for each factor in the 
Japan and Canada cases was based primarily on my subjective interpretation, which, again, 
was grounded in my detailed understanding of the cases. However, it was also informed by 
statements and judgments of other scholars. However, other scholars may have different 
interpretations of the historical changes in influence. 
One way to help resolve the above two limitations would be through interviews. Thus, 
a third limitation is lack of interviews with policy-makers and/or BMD experts. Conducting 
interviews would have informed my selection of factors and helped me better understand the 
importance and relative influence of the factors during the past 30 years. Lack of time and 
financial resources inhibited me from conducting interviews. 
7.4 Further Research 
My research provided an opportunity to compare bilateral BMD politics between the 
U.S. and two middle power states. As already mentioned, my research method could easily 
be applied to other middle power states. It could even be applied to non-middle power states 
because the general categories of factors I used are not necessarily restricted to middle power 
states. Other states that could be profitably researched include the U.K., Italy, and the Czech 
Republic. 
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America's BMD policy has changed significantly since the election of President 
Barak Obama in 2008 Thus, besides performing other cases studies over the same 1980s to 
2008 time span, my methodology could be extended beyond 2008 to analyze various 
countries' reactions to the new Obama policy 
Soon after Obama was inaugurated, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced in 
January 2009 that the Obama administration would revise Bush's missile defense plan, which 
focused on developing a global-scale, multiple-layered defense system using integrated 
NMD and TMD in order to be able to intercept ballistic missiles in all three phases 268 
Instead, the Obama administration wanted to concentrate on missile threats caused by rogue 
states such as Iran and the D P R K For that purpose, TMD systems would be given 
priority 269 In addition, Gates announced that the MDA budget would be reduced by US$1 4 
billion270 Subsequently, in September 2009 Obama announced that he would cancel George 
W Bush's planned BMD systems in Poland (ten ground-based interceptors) and the Czech 
Republic (a radar system), instead, he would deploy a system to intercept shorter-range 
missiles from Iran It would consist of smaller SM-3 missiles, first deployed on ships and 
later in southern Europe or Turkey 272 
This U S policy shift was controversial The Polish government, for instance, was 
shocked and disappointed because, regardless of domestic opposition, the Polish government 
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had made significant efforts to cooperate with the U.S. on BMD.273 Some see Obama as 
"wooing Russia."274 Within the U.S., some conservatives are skeptical. Job Bolton, the U.S. 
ambassador to the UN during the Bush administration, believes that Obama is offering 
"much of what Russia wants while getting very little in return."275 Russia has basically 
welcomed Obama's new U.S. BMD policies, especially the decision not to deploy BMD 
systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, especially by negotiating a new version of the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. in 1991 to reduce strategic offensive arms, and which expired in December 2009.276 
Obama has also been seeking Russian cooperation to isolate and sanction Iran.277 All of these 
diplomatic maneuvers fit into Obama's larger goal of creating a nuclear-weapon-free world. 
In April 2010, a Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, D.C., and Obama 
successfully gathered representatives of 47 nations from all over the world. It was the largest 
diplomatic event held by a U.S. president since 1945.278 
The research in this thesis can be used as a basis for tackling the new and different 
questions and dilemmas posed by Obama's BMD policies. Changes would have to be made 
in my methodology. In this thesis I focused on a comparison of bilateral relations. However, 
analysis of the "new" BMD relations would have to be expanded to include a more 
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multilateral orientation because this is the direction Obama is taking BMD decision-making. 
Thus, I could envision further research encompassing not only more bilateral case studies 
covering the 1980s to 2008 time period but also multilateral analysis from 2008 to the 
present. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Analysis of BMD politics, while not currently a glamorous topic of research, is 
important because it is not an exaggeration to say that missile defense could, if its 
effectiveness were proven beyond a doubt, change the current balance of power in 
international society. The U.S. will most likely continue to develop and deploy its missile 
defense systems domestically and internationally. And, the rest of the world, including other 
superpower, middle power and small power countries, will try to catch up with U.S. BMD 
will in this regard not die out unless all ballistic missiles are eliminated. However, it is 
uncertain whether these systems will ever function effectively and whether somehow they 
can contribute to establishing peace and stability. We do not know how BMD will influence 
the world in the future, but, as was shown in this thesis, we do know that BMD systems have 
influenced countries like Japan and Canada, and that the concepts and systems of BMD have 
the potential to fundamentally alter military strategy and balance of power. It is my hope that 
this thesis has shed some light on how BMD has shaped the world over the last 30 years. To 
ensure appropriate decision-making related to these complex technological systems, we must 
continue researching and thinking about BMD issues from all perspectives, including 
political, economic, military, technological, and environmental. 
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